Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 19:16:04 +0100 From: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Peter_Ankerst=E5l?= <peter@pean.org> To: Darren Pilgrim <list_freebsd@bluerosetech.com> Cc: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Errata Notice FreeBSD-EN-14:01.random Message-ID: <61972F13-545A-428F-A909-83BDE811C3F5@pean.org> In-Reply-To: <52D6BF9C.8070405@bluerosetech.com> References: <201401142011.s0EKBoi7082738@freefall.freebsd.org> <52D6BF9C.8070405@bluerosetech.com>
next in thread | previous in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
On 15 Jan 2014, at 18:04, Darren Pilgrim <list_freebsd@bluerosetech.com> wrote: > On 1/14/2014 12:11 PM, FreeBSD Errata Notices wrote: >> III. Impact >> >> Someone who has control over these hardware RNGs would be able to >> predicate the output from random(4) and urandom(4) devices and may be able >> to reveal unique keys that are used to encrypt data. > > This is good to know, but I have to wonder: > > If the attacker has that level of access to the hardware, I would expect one of two things is also true: > > 1. If you're on "bare metal", the attacker has firmware-level or physical access to the machine; > 2. If you're on a hypervisor, you can't trust the hypervisor; > > In both cases, I would think the attacker can use much simpler, more direct vectors and you have much worse things to worry about than the quality of /dev/random. I'm not questioning the validity of the advisory, I'm genuinely curious about this. I can't think of a scenario were someone could attack /dev/random using this vector without 1 or 2 above also being true. > _______________________________________________ > freebsd-stable@freebsd.org mailing list > http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-stable > To unsubscribe, send any mail to "freebsd-stable-unsubscribe@freebsd.org" > The manufacturer of a good friend of the manufacturer interested in decrypting stuff. /Peter.
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?61972F13-545A-428F-A909-83BDE811C3F5>