From owner-svn-ports-all@freebsd.org Fri Sep 7 03:49:47 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-ports-all@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3BE5BFEED3E; Fri, 7 Sep 2018 03:49:47 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from cy@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E5D5B78825; Fri, 7 Sep 2018 03:49:46 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from cy@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DC93016985; Fri, 7 Sep 2018 03:49:46 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from cy@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id w873nkAB032391; Fri, 7 Sep 2018 03:49:46 GMT (envelope-from cy@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from cy@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id w873nkT9032390; Fri, 7 Sep 2018 03:49:46 GMT (envelope-from cy@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201809070349.w873nkT9032390@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: cy set sender to cy@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Cy Schubert Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 03:49:46 +0000 (UTC) To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r479178 - head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Group: ports-head X-SVN-Commit-Author: cy X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/security/vuxml X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 479178 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: ports MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-ports-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.27 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the ports tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Sep 2018 03:49:47 -0000 Author: cy Date: Fri Sep 7 03:49:46 2018 New Revision: 479178 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/479178 Log: Remove duplicate entry for WPA EAPOL vulnerability. Use r477829 instead as its version range is more complete. PR: 231054 Reported by: 000.fbsd@quip.cz Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Modified: head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml ============================================================================== --- head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Fri Sep 7 03:25:50 2018 (r479177) +++ head/security/vuxml/vuln.xml Fri Sep 7 03:49:46 2018 (r479178) @@ -761,76 +761,6 @@ Notes: - - wpa_supplicant -- unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data - - - wpa_supplicant - 2.6_2 - - - FreeBSD - 10.4_10 - 11.2_1 - - - - -

SO-AND-SO reports:

-
A vulnerability was found in how wpa_supplicant processes - EAPOL-Key frames. It is possible for an attacker to modify - the frame in a way that makes wpa_supplicant decrypt the Key - Data field without requiring a valid MIC value in the frame, - i.e., without the frame being authenticated. This has a - potential issue in the case where WPA2/RSN style of EAPOL-Key - construction is used with TKIP negotiated as the pairwise - cipher. It should be noted that WPA2 is not supposed to be - used with TKIP as the pairwise cipher. Instead, CCMP is - expected to be used and with that pairwise cipher, this - vulnerability is not applicable in practice.
-
When TKIP is negotiated as the pairwise cipher, the EAPOL-Key - Key Data field is encrypted using RC4. This vulnerability - allows unauthenticated EAPOL-Key frames to be processed and - due to the RC4 design, this makes it possible for an attacker - to modify the plaintext version of the Key Data field with - bitwise XOR operations without knowing the contents. This can - be used to cause a denial of service attack by modifying - GTK/IGTK on the station (without the attacker learning any of - the keys) which would prevent the station from accepting - received group-addressed frames. Furthermore, this might be - abused by making wpa_supplicant act as a decryption oracle to - try to recover some of the Key Data payload (GTK/IGTK) to get - knowledge of the group encryption keys.
-
Full recovery of the group encryption keys requires multiple - attempts (128 connection attempts per octet) and each attempt - results in disconnection due to a failure to complete the 4-way - handshake. These failures can result in the AP/network getting - disabled temporarily or even permanently (requiring user action - to re-enable) which may make it impractical to perform the - attack to recover the keys before the AP has already changes - the group keys. By default, wpa_supplicant is enforcing at - minimum a ten second wait time between each failed connection - attempt, i.e., over 20 minutes waiting to recover each octet - while hostapd AP implementation uses 10 minute default for GTK - rekeying when using TKIP. With such timing behavior, practical - attack would need large number of impacted stations to be - trying to connect to the same AP to be able to recover - sufficient information from the GTK to be able to determine - the key before it gets changed.
-

- - - - https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/unauthenticated-eapol-key-decryption.txt - CVE-2018-14526 - - - 2018-08-08 - 2018-08-14 - - - Flash Player -- multiple vulnerabilities