From owner-dev-commits-src-all@freebsd.org Thu Feb 18 22:17:44 2021 Return-Path: Delivered-To: dev-commits-src-all@mailman.nyi.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AC82452A72C; Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:17:44 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from git@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256 client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "R3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4DhTbr4X7lz3vjd; Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:17:44 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from git@FreeBSD.org) Received: from gitrepo.freebsd.org (gitrepo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:5]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8E99220703; Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:17:44 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from git@FreeBSD.org) Received: from gitrepo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.44]) by gitrepo.freebsd.org (8.16.1/8.16.1) with ESMTP id 11IMHiTW078305; Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:17:44 GMT (envelope-from git@gitrepo.freebsd.org) Received: (from git@localhost) by gitrepo.freebsd.org (8.16.1/8.16.1/Submit) id 11IMHiwm078304; Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:17:44 GMT (envelope-from git) Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:17:44 GMT Message-Id: <202102182217.11IMHiwm078304@gitrepo.freebsd.org> To: src-committers@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-src-all@FreeBSD.org, dev-commits-src-main@FreeBSD.org From: Rick Macklem Subject: git: b9cbc85d7272 - main - nfs-over-tls: add user space daemons rpc.tlsclntd and rpc.tlsservd MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Git-Committer: rmacklem X-Git-Repository: src X-Git-Refname: refs/heads/main X-Git-Reftype: branch X-Git-Commit: b9cbc85d727214cf3e13196ab7e7564e53037f77 Auto-Submitted: auto-generated X-BeenThere: dev-commits-src-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: Commit messages for all branches of the src repository List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2021 22:17:44 -0000 The branch main has been updated by rmacklem: URL: https://cgit.FreeBSD.org/src/commit/?id=b9cbc85d727214cf3e13196ab7e7564e53037f77 commit b9cbc85d727214cf3e13196ab7e7564e53037f77 Author: Rick Macklem AuthorDate: 2021-02-18 22:08:19 +0000 Commit: Rick Macklem CommitDate: 2021-02-18 22:15:03 +0000 nfs-over-tls: add user space daemons rpc.tlsclntd and rpc.tlsservd The kernel changes needed for nfs-over-tls have been committed to main. However, nfs-over-tls requires user space daemons to handle the TLS handshake and other non-application data TLS records. There is one daemon (rpc.tlsclntd) for the client side and one daemon (rpc.tlsservd) for the server side, although they share a fair amount of code found in rpc.tlscommon.c and rpc.tlscommon.h. They use a KTLS enabled OpenSSL to perform the actual work and, as such, are only built when MK_OPENSSL_KTLS is set. Communication with the kernel is done via upcall RPCs done on AF_LOCAL sockets and the custom system call rpctls_syscall. Reviewed by: gbe (man pages only), jhb (usr.sbin/Makefile only) Comments by: jhb MFC after: 2 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28430 Relnotes: yes --- usr.sbin/Makefile | 2 + usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile | 29 ++ usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8 | 201 ++++++++ usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c | 730 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/Makefile | 29 ++ usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.c | 295 +++++++++++ usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlscommon.h | 68 +++ usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.8 | 348 +++++++++++++ usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd/rpc.tlsservd.c | 886 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 2588 insertions(+) diff --git a/usr.sbin/Makefile b/usr.sbin/Makefile index 39913a327b87..259ab72f2281 100644 --- a/usr.sbin/Makefile +++ b/usr.sbin/Makefile @@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ SUBDIR.${MK_NIS}+= ypserv SUBDIR.${MK_NIS}+= ypset SUBDIR.${MK_NTP}+= ntp SUBDIR.${MK_OPENSSL}+= keyserv +SUBDIR.${MK_OPENSSL_KTLS}+= rpc.tlsclntd +SUBDIR.${MK_OPENSSL_KTLS}+= rpc.tlsservd SUBDIR.${MK_PF}+= ftp-proxy SUBDIR.${MK_PKGBOOTSTRAP}+= pkg SUBDIR.${MK_PMC}+= pmc pmcannotate pmccontrol pmcstat pmcstudy diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1c8481a7889c --- /dev/null +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +# $FreeBSD$ + +.include + +PROG= rpc.tlsclntd +MAN= rpc.tlsclntd.8 +SRCS= rpc.tlsclntd.c rpc.tlscommon.c rpctlscd.h rpctlscd_svc.c rpctlscd_xdr.c + +CFLAGS+= -I. -I${SRCTOP}/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd + +LIBADD= ssl crypto util + +CLEANFILES= rpctlscd_svc.c rpctlscd_xdr.c rpctlscd.h + +RPCSRC= ${SRCTOP}/sys/rpc/rpcsec_tls/rpctlscd.x +RPCGEN= RPCGEN_CPP=${CPP:Q} rpcgen -L -C -M + +rpctlscd_svc.c: ${RPCSRC} rpctlscd.h + ${RPCGEN} -m -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +rpctlscd_xdr.c: ${RPCSRC} rpctlscd.h + ${RPCGEN} -c -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +rpctlscd.h: ${RPCSRC} + ${RPCGEN} -h -o ${.TARGET} ${RPCSRC} + +.PATH: ${SRCTOP}/sys/rpc/rpcsec_tls ${SRCTOP}/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsservd + +.include diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8 b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..23a9d05495c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.8 @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +.\" Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/ +.\" Authors: Doug Rabson +.\" Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein +.\" +.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +.\" are met: +.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. +.\" +.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND +.\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE +.\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +.\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +.\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS +.\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) +.\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +.\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY +.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF +.\" SUCH DAMAGE. +.\" +.\" $FreeBSD$ +.\" +.\" Modified from gssd.8 for rpc.tlsclntd.8 by Rick Macklem. +.Dd February 17, 2021 +.Dt RPC.TLSCLNTD 8 +.Os +.Sh NAME +.Nm rpc.tlsclntd +.Nd "Sun RPC over TLS Client Daemon" +.Sh SYNOPSIS +.Nm +.Op Fl C Ar preferred_ciphers +.Op Fl D Ar certdir +.Op Fl d +.Op Fl l Ar CAfile +.Op Fl m +.Op Fl p Ar CApath +.Op Fl r Ar CRLfile +.Op Fl v +.Sh DESCRIPTION +The +.Nm +program provides support for the client side of the kernel Sun RPC over TLS +implementation. +This daemon must be running for the kernel RPC to be able to do a TLS +connection to a server for an NFS over TLS mount. +This daemon requires that the kernel be built with +.Dq options KERNEL_TLS +and be running on an architecture such as +.Dq amd64 +that supports a direct map (not i386) with +.Xr ktls 4 +enabled. +.Pp +If either of the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +options have been specified, the daemon will require the server's +certificate to verify +and have a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) in it. +This FQDN must match +the reverse DNS name for the IP address that +the server is using for the TCP connection. +The FQDN may be +in either the DNS field of the subjectAltName or the CN field of the +subjectName in the certificate and +cannot have a wildcard +.Dq * +in it. +.Pp +If a SIGHUP signal is sent to the daemon it will reload the +.Dq CRLfile +and will shut down any extant connections that presented certificates +during TLS handshake that have been revoked. +If the +.Fl r +option was not specified, the SIGHUP signal will be ignored. +.Pp +The daemon will log failed certificate verifications via +.Xr syslogd 8 +using LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON when the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +option has been specified. +.Pp +The options are as follows: +.Bl -tag -width indent +.It Fl C Ar preferred_ciphers , Fl Fl ciphers= Ns Ar preferred_ciphers +Specify what preferred ciphers are to be used. +If this option is specified, +.Dq SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list() +will be called with +.Dq preferred_ciphers +as the argument. +If this option is not specified, the cipher will be chosen by +.Xr ssl 7 . +.It Fl D Ar certdir , Fl Fl certdir= Ns Ar certdir +Use +.Dq certdir +instead of /etc/rpc.tlsclntd for the +.Fl m +option. +.It Fl d , Fl Fl debuglevel +Run in debug mode. +In this mode, +.Nm +will not fork when it starts. +.It Fl l Ar CAfile , Fl Fl verifylocs= Ns Ar CAfile +This specifies the path name of a CAfile which holds the information +for server certificate verification. +This path name is used in +.Dq SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx,CAfile,NULL) +and +.Dq SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)) +openssl library calls. +Note that this is a path name for the file and is not assumed to be +in +.Dq certdir . +.It Fl m , Fl Fl mutualverf +Enable support for mutual authentication. +A certificate and associated key must be found in /etc/rpc.tlsclntd +(or the directory specified by the +.Fl D +option) +in case a server requests a peer certificate. +The first certificate needs to be in a file named +.Dq cert.pem +and the associated key in a file named +.Dq certkey.pem . +The +.Xr mount_nfs 8 +option +.Fl tlscertname +can be used to override the default certificate for a given +NFS mount, where the files use the alternate naming specified by the option. +If there is a passphrase on the +.Dq certkey.pem +file, this daemon will prompt for the passphrase during startup. +The keys for alternate certificates cannot have passphrases. +.It Fl p Ar CApath , Fl Fl verifydir= Ns Ar CApath +This option is similar to the +.Fl l +option, but specifies the path of a directory with CA +certificates in it. +When this option is used, +.Dq SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx,SSL_load_client_CA_file()) +is not called, so a list of CA names is not be passed +to the server during the TLS handshake. +The openssl documentation indicates this call is rarely needed. +.It Fl r Ar CRLfile , Fl Fl crl= Ns Ar CRLfile +This option specifies a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) file +that is to be loaded into the verify certificate store and +checked during verification of the server's certificate. +This option is meaningless unless either the +.Fl l +or +.Fl p +have been specified. +.It Fl v , Fl Fl verbose +Run in verbose mode. +In this mode, +.Nm +will log activity messages to syslog using LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON or to +stderr, if the +.Fl d +option has also been specified. +.El +.Sh EXIT STATUS +.Ex -std +.Sh SEE ALSO +.Xr openssl 1 , +.Xr ktls 4 , +.Xr mount_nfs 8 , +.Xr rpc.tlsservd 8 , +.Xr ssl 7 , +.Xr syslogd 8 +.Sh STANDARDS +The implementation is based on the specification in +.Rs +.%B "RFC NNNN" +.%T "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" +.Re +.Sh HISTORY +The +.Nm +manual page first appeared in +.Fx 13.0 . +.Sh BUGS +This daemon cannot be safely shut down and restarted if there are +any active RPC-over-TLS connections. +Doing so will orphan the KERNEL_TLS connections, so that they +can no longer do upcalls successfully, since the +.Dq SSL * +structures in userspace have been lost. diff --git a/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..af803f203ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/usr.sbin/rpc.tlsclntd/rpc.tlsclntd.c @@ -0,0 +1,730 @@ +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD + * + * Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/ + * Authors: Doug Rabson + * Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/* + * Extensively modified from /usr/src/usr.sbin/gssd.c r344402 for + * the client side of kernel RPC-over-TLS by Rick Macklem. + */ + +#include +__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "rpctlscd.h" +#include "rpc.tlscommon.h" + +#ifndef _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK +#define _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK "/var/run/rpc.tlsclntd.sock" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_CERTANDKEY +#define _PATH_CERTANDKEY "/etc/rpc.tlsclntd/" +#endif +#ifndef _PATH_RPCTLSCDPID +#define _PATH_RPCTLSCDPID "/var/run/rpc.tlsclntd.pid" +#endif + +/* Global variables also used by rpc.tlscommon.c. */ +int rpctls_debug_level; +bool rpctls_verbose; +SSL_CTX *rpctls_ctx = NULL; +const char *rpctls_verify_cafile = NULL; +const char *rpctls_verify_capath = NULL; +char *rpctls_crlfile = NULL; +bool rpctls_cert = false; +bool rpctls_gothup = false; +struct ssl_list rpctls_ssllist; + +static struct pidfh *rpctls_pfh = NULL; +static const char *rpctls_certdir = _PATH_CERTANDKEY; +static const char *rpctls_ciphers = NULL; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_refno = 0; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_sec = 0; +static uint64_t rpctls_ssl_usec = 0; + +static void rpctlscd_terminate(int); +static SSL_CTX *rpctls_setupcl_ssl(void); +static SSL *rpctls_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx, int s, char *certname, + u_int certlen, X509 **certp); +static void rpctls_huphandler(int sig __unused); + +extern void rpctlscd_1(struct svc_req *rqstp, SVCXPRT *transp); + +static struct option longopts[] = { + { "certdir", required_argument, NULL, 'D' }, + { "ciphers", required_argument, NULL, 'C' }, + { "debuglevel", no_argument, NULL, 'd' }, + { "verifylocs", required_argument, NULL, 'l' }, + { "mutualverf", no_argument, NULL, 'm' }, + { "verifydir", required_argument, NULL, 'p' }, + { "crl", required_argument, NULL, 'r' }, + { "verbose", no_argument, NULL, 'v' }, + { NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } +}; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + /* + * We provide an RPC service on a local-domain socket. The + * kernel rpctls code will upcall to this daemon to do the initial + * TLS handshake. + */ + struct sockaddr_un sun; + int ch, fd, oldmask; + SVCXPRT *xprt; + bool tls_enable; + struct timeval tm; + struct timezone tz; + pid_t otherpid; + size_t tls_enable_len; + + /* Check that another rpctlscd isn't already running. */ + rpctls_pfh = pidfile_open(_PATH_RPCTLSCDPID, 0600, &otherpid); + if (rpctls_pfh == NULL) { + if (errno == EEXIST) + errx(1, "rpctlscd already running, pid: %d.", otherpid); + warn("cannot open or create pidfile"); + } + + /* Check to see that the ktls is enabled. */ + tls_enable_len = sizeof(tls_enable); + if (sysctlbyname("kern.ipc.tls.enable", &tls_enable, &tls_enable_len, + NULL, 0) != 0 || !tls_enable) + errx(1, "Kernel TLS not enabled"); + + /* Get the time when this daemon is started. */ + gettimeofday(&tm, &tz); + rpctls_ssl_sec = tm.tv_sec; + rpctls_ssl_usec = tm.tv_usec; + + rpctls_verbose = false; + while ((ch = getopt_long(argc, argv, "CD:dl:mp:r:v", longopts, NULL)) != + -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'C': + rpctls_ciphers = optarg; + break; + case 'D': + rpctls_certdir = optarg; + break; + case 'd': + rpctls_debug_level++; + break; + case 'l': + rpctls_verify_cafile = optarg; + break; + case 'm': + rpctls_cert = true; + break; + case 'p': + rpctls_verify_capath = optarg; + break; + case 'r': + rpctls_crlfile = optarg; + break; + case 'v': + rpctls_verbose = true; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s " + "[-C/--ciphers preferred_ciphers] " + "[-D/--certdir certdir] [-d/--debuglevel] " + "[-l/--verifylocs CAfile] [-m/--mutualverf] " + "[-p/--verifydir CApath] [-r/--crl CRLfile] " + "[-v/--verbose]\n", argv[0]); + exit(1); + break; + } + } + if (rpctls_crlfile != NULL && rpctls_verify_cafile == NULL && + rpctls_verify_capath == NULL) + errx(1, "-r requires the -l and/or " + "-p options"); + + if (modfind("krpc") < 0) { + /* Not present in kernel, try loading it */ + if (kldload("krpc") < 0 || modfind("krpc") < 0) + errx(1, "Kernel RPC is not available"); + } + + /* + * Set up the SSL_CTX *. + * Do it now, before daemonizing, in case the private key + * is encrypted and requires a passphrase to be entered. + */ + rpctls_ctx = rpctls_setupcl_ssl(); + if (rpctls_ctx == NULL) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't set up TLS context"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't set up TLS context"); + } + LIST_INIT(&rpctls_ssllist); + + if (!rpctls_debug_level) { + if (daemon(0, 0) != 0) + err(1, "Can't daemonize"); + signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); + } + signal(SIGTERM, rpctlscd_terminate); + signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGHUP, rpctls_huphandler); + + pidfile_write(rpctls_pfh); + + memset(&sun, 0, sizeof sun); + sun.sun_family = AF_LOCAL; + unlink(_PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK); + strcpy(sun.sun_path, _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK); + sun.sun_len = SUN_LEN(&sun); + fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (fd < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't create local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't create local rpctlscd socket"); + } + oldmask = umask(S_IXUSR|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO); + if (bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sun, sun.sun_len) < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, "Can't bind local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't bind local rpctlscd socket"); + } + umask(oldmask); + if (listen(fd, SOMAXCONN) < 0) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't listen on local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't listen on local rpctlscd socket"); + } + xprt = svc_vc_create(fd, RPC_MAXDATASIZE, RPC_MAXDATASIZE); + if (!xprt) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't create transport for local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't create transport for local rpctlscd socket"); + } + if (!svc_reg(xprt, RPCTLSCD, RPCTLSCDVERS, rpctlscd_1, NULL)) { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, + "Can't register service for local rpctlscd socket"); + exit(1); + } + err(1, "Can't register service for local rpctlscd socket"); + } + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSETPATH, _PATH_RPCTLSCDSOCK); + + rpctls_svc_run(); + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSHUTDOWN, ""); + + SSL_CTX_free(rpctls_ctx); + EVP_cleanup(); + return (0); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_null_1_svc(__unused void *argp, __unused void *result, + __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlscd_null: done\n"); + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_connect_1_svc(struct rpctlscd_connect_arg *argp, + struct rpctlscd_connect_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + int s; + SSL *ssl; + struct ssl_entry *newslp; + X509 *cert; + + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlsd_connect: started\n"); + /* Get the socket fd from the kernel. */ + s = rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSOCKET, ""); + if (s < 0) { + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOSOCKET; + return (TRUE); + } + + /* Do a TLS connect handshake. */ + ssl = rpctls_connect(rpctls_ctx, s, argp->certname.certname_val, + argp->certname.certname_len, &cert); + if (ssl == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlsd_connect: can't do TLS " + "handshake\n"); + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOSSL; + } else { + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + result->sec = rpctls_ssl_sec; + result->usec = rpctls_ssl_usec; + result->ssl = ++rpctls_ssl_refno; + /* Hard to believe this will ever wrap around.. */ + if (rpctls_ssl_refno == 0) + result->ssl = ++rpctls_ssl_refno; + } + + if (ssl == NULL) { + /* + * For RPC-over-TLS, this upcall is expected + * to close off the socket. + */ + close(s); + return (TRUE); + } + + /* Maintain list of all current SSL *'s */ + newslp = malloc(sizeof(*newslp)); + newslp->refno = rpctls_ssl_refno; + newslp->s = s; + newslp->shutoff = false; + newslp->ssl = ssl; + newslp->cert = cert; + LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&rpctls_ssllist, newslp, next); + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_handlerecord_1_svc(struct rpctlscd_handlerecord_arg *argp, + struct rpctlscd_handlerecord_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + int ret; + char junk; + + slp = NULL; + if (argp->sec == rpctls_ssl_sec && argp->usec == + rpctls_ssl_usec) { + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) { + if (slp->refno == argp->ssl) + break; + } + } + + if (slp != NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlscd_handlerecord fd=%d\n", + slp->s); + /* + * An SSL_read() of 0 bytes should fail, but it should + * handle the non-application data record before doing so. + */ + ret = SSL_read(slp->ssl, &junk, 0); + if (ret <= 0) { + /* Check to see if this was a close alert. */ + ret = SSL_get_shutdown(slp->ssl); + if ((ret & (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | + SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) == SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) + SSL_shutdown(slp->ssl); + } else { + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_ERR, "SSL_read returned %d", ret); + else + fprintf(stderr, "SSL_read returned %d\n", ret); + } + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + } else + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOSSL; + return (TRUE); +} + +bool_t +rpctlscd_disconnect_1_svc(struct rpctlscd_disconnect_arg *argp, + struct rpctlscd_disconnect_res *result, __unused struct svc_req *rqstp) +{ + struct ssl_entry *slp; + int ret; + + slp = NULL; + if (argp->sec == rpctls_ssl_sec && argp->usec == + rpctls_ssl_usec) { + LIST_FOREACH(slp, &rpctls_ssllist, next) { + if (slp->refno == argp->ssl) + break; + } + } + + if (slp != NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctlscd_disconnect: fd=%d closed\n", + slp->s); + LIST_REMOVE(slp, next); + if (!slp->shutoff) { + ret = SSL_get_shutdown(slp->ssl); + /* + * Do an SSL_shutdown() unless a close alert has + * already been sent. + */ + if ((ret & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0) + SSL_shutdown(slp->ssl); + } + SSL_free(slp->ssl); + if (slp->cert != NULL) + X509_free(slp->cert); + /* + * For RPC-over-TLS, this upcall is expected + * to close off the socket. + */ + if (!slp->shutoff) + shutdown(slp->s, SHUT_WR); + close(slp->s); + free(slp); + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_OK; + } else + result->reterr = RPCTLSERR_NOCLOSE; + return (TRUE); +} + +int +rpctlscd_1_freeresult(__unused SVCXPRT *transp, __unused xdrproc_t xdr_result, + __unused caddr_t result) +{ + + return (TRUE); +} + +static void +rpctlscd_terminate(int sig __unused) +{ + + rpctls_syscall(RPCTLS_SYSC_CLSHUTDOWN, ""); + pidfile_remove(rpctls_pfh); + exit(0); +} + +static SSL_CTX * +rpctls_setupcl_ssl(void) +{ + SSL_CTX *ctx; + long flags; + char path[PATH_MAX]; + size_t len, rlen; + int ret; + + SSL_library_init(); + SSL_load_error_strings(); + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); + if (ctx == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: SSL_CTX_new " + "failed\n"); + return (NULL); + } + SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1); + + if (rpctls_ciphers != NULL) { + /* + * Set preferred ciphers, since KERN_TLS only supports a + * few of them. + */ + ret = SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, rpctls_ciphers); + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: " + "SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list failed: %s\n", + rpctls_ciphers); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + } + + /* + * If rpctls_cert is true, a certificate and key exists in + * rpctls_certdir, so that it can do mutual authentication. + */ + if (rpctls_cert) { + /* Get the cert.pem and certkey.pem files. */ + len = strlcpy(path, rpctls_certdir, sizeof(path)); + rlen = sizeof(path) - len; + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "cert.pem", rlen) != 8) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, path, + SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: can't use " + "certificate file path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "certkey.pem", rlen) != 11) { + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, path, + SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: Can't use " + "private key path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + } + + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) { + if (rpctls_crlfile != NULL) { + ret = rpctls_loadcrlfile(ctx); + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: " + "Load CRLfile failed\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + } +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000 + ret = 1; + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL) + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(ctx, + rpctls_verify_cafile); + if (ret != 0 && rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(ctx, + rpctls_verify_capath); +#else + ret = SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, + rpctls_verify_cafile, rpctls_verify_capath); +#endif + if (ret == 0) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_setupcl_ssl: " + "Can't load verify locations\n"); + SSL_CTX_free(ctx); + return (NULL); + } + /* + * The man page says that the + * SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list() call is not normally + * needed, but I believe it is harmless. + */ + if (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL) + SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx, + SSL_load_client_CA_file(rpctls_verify_cafile)); + } + + /* RPC-over-TLS must use TLSv1.3, according to the IETF draft.*/ +#ifdef notyet + flags = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 | + SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2; +#else + flags = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3; +#endif + SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, flags); + SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_TX | SSL_MODE_NO_KTLS_RX); + return (ctx); +} + +static SSL * +rpctls_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx, int s, char *certname, u_int certlen, X509 **certp) +{ + SSL *ssl; + X509 *cert; + struct sockaddr_storage ad; + struct sockaddr *sad; + char hostnam[NI_MAXHOST], path[PATH_MAX]; + int gethostret, ret; + char *cp, *cp2; + size_t len, rlen; + long verfret; + + *certp = NULL; + sad = (struct sockaddr *)&ad; + ssl = SSL_new(ctx); + if (ssl == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: " + "SSL_new failed\n"); + return (NULL); + } + if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, s) != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: " + "SSL_set_fd failed\n"); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * If rpctls_cert is true and certname is set, a alternate certificate + * and key exists in files named .pem and key.pem + * in rpctls_certdir that is to be used for mutual authentication. + */ + if (rpctls_cert && certlen > 0) { + len = strlcpy(path, rpctls_certdir, sizeof(path)); + rlen = sizeof(path) - len; + if (rlen <= certlen) { + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + memcpy(&path[len], certname, certlen); + rlen -= certlen; + len += certlen; + path[len] = '\0'; + if (strlcpy(&path[len], ".pem", rlen) != 4) { + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_use_certificate_file(ssl, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: can't use " + "certificate file path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + if (strlcpy(&path[len], "key.pem", rlen) != 7) { + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + ret = SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(ssl, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: Can't use " + "private key path=%s ret=%d\n", path, ret); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + } + + ret = SSL_connect(ssl); + if (ret != 1) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: " + "SSL_connect failed %d\n", + ret); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + + cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); + if (cert == NULL) { + rpctls_verbose_out("rpctls_connect: get peer" + " certificate failed\n"); + SSL_free(ssl); + return (NULL); + } + gethostret = rpctls_gethost(s, sad, hostnam, sizeof(hostnam)); + if (gethostret == 0) + hostnam[0] = '\0'; + verfret = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl); + if (verfret == X509_V_OK && (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || + rpctls_verify_capath != NULL) && (gethostret == 0 || + rpctls_checkhost(sad, cert, X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) != 1)) + verfret = X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH; + if (verfret != X509_V_OK && (rpctls_verify_cafile != NULL || + rpctls_verify_capath != NULL)) { + if (verfret != X509_V_OK) { + cp = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), + NULL, 0); + cp2 = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), + NULL, 0); + if (rpctls_debug_level == 0) + syslog(LOG_INFO | LOG_DAEMON, + "rpctls_connect: client IP %s " + "issuerName=%s subjectName=%s verify " + "failed %s\n", hostnam, cp, cp2, + X509_verify_cert_error_string(verfret)); *** 1700 LINES SKIPPED ***