Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2002 11:56:01 -0700 (PDT) From: "Neal E. Westfall" <nwestfal@directvinternet.com> To: Terry Lambert <tlambert2@mindspring.com> Cc: Dave Hayes <dave@jetcafe.org>, <chat@FreeBSD.ORG> Subject: Re: Why did evolution fail? Message-ID: <20020831093523.G8288-100000@Tolstoy.home.lan> In-Reply-To: <3D70590E.A1935AF3@mindspring.com>
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On Fri, 30 Aug 2002, Terry Lambert wrote:
> "Neal E. Westfall" wrote:
> [ ... the treating of treatable genetic problems ... ]
> > But you've just dodged my question. Is it a good thing that we have
> > the ability to keep those traits in the gene pool?
>
> Probably not. I'd just as soon not be selected against, however.
Most people wouldn't. That's the problem with evolution. People
like when it gives them an out, but practically people have to live
their lives as though the exact opposite were the truth.
> > Or is the development of that ability also a result of evolution?
>
> Probably not. Both the cause and the effect are exogenous. If I
> remove a connection in a ffedback circuit, it's not "part of the
> feedback circuit".
This is turning out to be a most productive conversation! I've
learned a new word today! I am most appreciative!
> > If so, how do we know that what we are talking about isn't actually
> > de-evolution?
>
> Technically, it probably is. On the other hand, there is a larger
> homeostatic system in effect. Consider if a near-ELE happened next
> Tuesday. With a collapse of the technical infrastructure that is
> necessary to the support of such people in opposition to environmental
> pressures, the pressures reassert themselves. The planet is certainly
> well over its carrying capacity for a low technology civilization; but
> the sudden conversion fron a high to low technology civilization would
> remove the support for a percentage of the population which was itself
> roughly proportional to the reduction in carrying capacity.
So then would it be correct to classify you as a monist? It seems
that you and Dave are actually on the same wavelength after all!
I know, I know, he's a dualist, but considering the fact that he
thinks everything is just one big dance, he's ultimately a monist.
Everything just "is."
> In effect, if it was suggently 1875 again from a technical perspective,
> then only people who could have survived with an 1875 technological
> base will survive.
I don't know, possibly the only result would be a lot of whining.
8-)
> This is really minor, though, compared to the
> reduction in population as a result of starvation, since distribution
> and production would get hit pretty hard, too, and they have a much
> higher immediate effect than the ability to replace your soft contact
> lenses in one month's time.
Probably.
> > By the same token, is the development of light bulbs a good thing?
> > Why? What I'm trying to get at is your ultimate criteria. Usefulness?
> > But then pragmatism is only useful if you know what ends to pursue.
>
> "What is the meaning of life?" 8-).
According to the Westminster Larger Catechism, Q&A#1, "To glorify
God and enjoy Him forever." 8-)
> I don't claim to have an answer to that question. What I do claim
> is that resetting the clock to an earlier time does no good. We know
> this because, to analogize Dave Hayes, there was no sudden heavenly
> chorus announcing the amount of real, user, and system time elapsed
> since the beginning of the universe, now that the run is complete.
It's complete?
> There is also the slight problem that clocks run forward, meaning
> that eventually you will get to the same point yet again, so you
> might as well cross that bridge sooner rather than later.
You'll have to excuse me for missing your point! <g>
> > Are these standards of conduct arbitrary?
>
> Humans have a certain amount of hard-wiring. To draw a simplistic
> parallel, maybe their "Add unity to memory" instruction takes 2 clock
> cycles, and their load register X with immediate takes 1 cycle, but
> their load register Y with immediate takes 50 cycles. But any Turing
> machine can actually run any software; it's just that some software
> runs better than other software, on a given set of hardware.
The problem with analogies is that sometimes they prove too much. Have
you ever met the Programmer?
> So I think most of these standards of conduct are emergent, based
> on their anti- or pro- species survival value.
Isn't the concept of "emergence" just a clever mask for "faith-based
committment"? I mean really, as a theist, I feel like an absolute
rationalist compared to you evolutionists! Consider this:
Let "A" represent the order we find in the universe.
Let "B" represent the various life forms in the universe.
Let "C" represent the intelligence possessed by some life forms.
Let "D" represent the moral nature possessed by man.
Then, according to whatever form of evolution subscribed to (darwinian,
neo-darwinian, punctuated equilibria, etc.):
1. Non-order begets order. (~A changes into A)
2. Non-life begets life. (~B changes into B)
3. Non-intelligence begets intelligence. (~C changes into C)
4. The Non-moral begets morality. (~D changes into D)
All of this is self-emergent, or self-creating, with no help from
any supernatural intelligence! I look at that and think, wow,
I guess I just don't have that kind of faith! Hence, the
classification of evolution as a religion. Louis Pasteur
disproved spontaneous generation but I guess some ideas die hard.
> > Why do societies go to war with each other, if not to enforce it's
> > own standards of morality on that other society?
>
> Jealousy. Trolls crossing the borders. Inability to effectively
> compete in the context of a given consensus rule set (e.g. there are
> no radical Moslem First World countries, there are no first world
> countries without some form of population controls, volintary or
> otherwise, there are no first world countries without immigration
> controls, there are no dominant religions that favor birth control,
> etc., etc.).
Well, then why do we fight back, if not to impose our standards
of morality on them? Besides, I would hardly classify Islam as
"not a dominant religion", unfortunate as that fact is.
> Consensus rule sets are intersting things, though. One does not
> really abitrarily arrive at a consensus rule set, one accepts a
> rule set and it becomes consensus because of the limitations of
> the physical universe. Murder is not tolerable, because it most
> definitely intereferes with the propagation of the genetic material
> of those who tolerate rate it, for example.
Yes, but one would have to show that propagation of the genetic
material and survival of the species is a goal worthy of pursuing.
I mean, how do you know that murder victims are just the unhappy
losers in the evolutionary fight for survival? Why do we keep
trying to subvert evolution with such things as "consensus rule
sets"? This seems to be self-defeating (in the larger scheme of
things).
> A higher standard of
> living leads to a longer reproductive life cycle, and limitations on
> expansion of population lead to a higher standard of living. There
> are counter pressures, of course, but they are not overriding, and
> so they do not lead to consensus rules, except in fractional
> societies which exist as part of a larger whole.
This all just seems like so much rationalization. I admit, longer
reproductive life spans and higher standard of living is nice from a
subjective perspective, but in the ultimate scheme of things how do
we know it isn't counter-productive?
> > Why enforce those standards, if there is no ultimate criteria by
> > which you could judge one society's standards as "right" over
> > against the other societies standards which are wrong?
>
> Richard Dawkins said it best, when he pointed out that this is all
> an elaborate competition between selfish genes (genes which are
> selfish, not genese which express as selfishness). They even build
> these huge hulking robots to carry them around, the better to
> propagate (some of these robots are called "humans").
There's one of those bad analogies again. <g>
> I guess in terms of conflicting societies, it comes down to whether
> powerful society A can suffer less powerful society B to exist.
Sometimes it comes down to whether more powerful society A can suffer
itself to exist, or rather God can suffer it to exist.
> > > Morality is dictated by the larger society, in any given context.
> > > It doesn't need to be transcendent, per se, it merely needs to
> > > transcend the individual, or the smaller society within the larger.
> >
> > Why does it need to transcend the individual, but not individual
> > societies?
>
> Marvin Minsky has a lot to say here, which would be useful; even
> if it has since been discredited in the AI community, I will
> recommend his book "Society of Mind".
>
> The answer as to why it needs to transcend the individual is that
> individuals share mutual boundaries. And if you note, I said that
> it *does* need to transcend individual societies ("the smaller
> society within the larger").
Why are mutual boundaries relevant? I mean, what does it really
matter if one piece of bio-matter A inadvertently bumps into
another piece of bio-matter B, and in the process changes it's
state from what we arbitrarily call "alive" to an equally
arbitrarily named state we call "dead". Such is nature red in
tooth and claw.
> > Or do you advocate a global society?
>
> Not really. I recognize it as emergent. The Geneva Convention,
> The World Court, The World Intellctual Property Association,
> Maritime Law, International Law, war, treaties, capitualation,
> etc..
Of course, what you call "emergent", is what some of us would
call "providence".
> > If so, is whatever mores that society adopts right by definition?
>
> Personally, I believe a global society is not possible, at least
> until there are one or more additional globes involved. Call it
> a result of "Thalience". 8-). There is an implicit need of "the
> other", at least in all the societies we've so far managed to
> construct.
Kind of a yin and yang thing then, eh?
> > Then it would not be an internal code of conduct, by definition.
> > Just because you wouldn't engage in a particular activity doesn't
> > mean that somebody else shouldn't.
>
> It turns out that there is an escape hatch. It has to do with the
> semantics of "human being". This is actually *why* it's OK to kill
> the enemy, without having to make an explicit exception which leads
> you to a slippery slope: you define them to not be a human being.
> The Sioux understood this implicitly. The translation of the Sioux
> word for themselves is "human being".
So did the National Socialists. That's some escape hatch. More
like out of the frying pan into the fire. That's all well and good,
until you find yourself on the receiving end of being defined in
such a manner.
> In reality, there's no avoiding externalizing ethics; if it's wrong
> to kill another human being, then it's wrong whwther the act is
> manifest by comission (performing the act) or omission (you permitting
> the act to be performed). By not acting, you act.
On the other hand, if man is the imago Deo, you at least have
a rationale for protecting God's image bearers through the means of
capital punishment. You fail to distinguish between murder and
killing. Killing under most circumstances *is* wrong, but in some
circumstances the greater sin comes from allowing murderers to
live. Hence, as a previous poster pointed out, the governing
authorities (whether Christian, or pagan) are ministers of God's
wrath.
> > Okay, but then if there is general agreement in that society that it
> > would be genetically beneficial to kill off a certain segment of
> > society, say, the jews, or people with certain genetic defects, it
> > is then moral by definition for that society to do so.
>
> It is moral *within the context of that society*. Whether neighboring
> societies would tolerate the activity is another matter altogether.
> Societies hold each other to consensual standards, as well, in the
> context of the society of societies of which they are members.
Why shouldn't they tolerate it?
> > > Individuals do not have morals, though individuals may *be* moral
> > > or *act* morally or *demonstrate* morality.
> >
> > Act morally with regard to what? You seem to think that a society
> > cannot enshrine laws that are immoral.
>
> They can't. They can enact them, but they can't enshrine them
> without the consent of the governed. The police will refuse to
> enforce them, or the citizens will ignore them. That's the
> difference between a law that has ben enacted, and one that is
> in effect.
I'm talking about a society that *does* consent, such as one that
tolerates abortion. By the way, if it were not for imigration,
most Western societies would be decreasing in population, as the
native population is not reproducing fast enough to replenish
those being lost. And by the way, speaking of abortion, isn't
this also counter-productive to evolution?
> In the case of a police state, where physical power is centralized,
> there's always the possibility of subversion, infiltration, or, in
> the limit, human wave assault.
This usually ends up with many dead humans.
> > > If you want to boil down this whole discussion so far, it's that
> > > Dave has an ethic which he would like to convert into a moral, by
> > > getting other people to share it. This ethic venerates the rights
> > > of the individual over the rights of the state (the society to
> > > which the individuals belong).
> >
> > And you are making the opposite error, of venerating the rights of
> > the state over the rights of the individual. Such societies
> > inevitably become tyrranical.
>
> To have a society is to grant that society rights over individuals.
> There is no such thing as a tyranny of one. By your argument, all
> jailed tyrants should be freed, because it's tyranical to jail a
> tyrant. But in freeing a tyrant to act upon your society, are you
> not therefore still tyranical, this time by proxy?
Ah, the fallacy of the false dichotomy. I never advocated Dave's
position any more than I advocated yours. I don't define tyranny
as being "not free". With freedom comes responsibility, and it is
acknowledged that the state must be granted some degree of power
for the purpose of securing individual rights. This means putting
tyrants in jail, and defining freedom in such a way as that it
excludes acts of wickedness. For this we need an external,
objective standard of ethics.
> > > My own objection to this is, first and foremost, that the rights
> > > of the state take precedence of the rights of the individual, as
> > > the state is composed of individuals, and the yardstick we must
> > > therefore use is that of the greatest good for the greatest number.
> >
> > I see. And what exactly is "the greatest good for the greatest
> > number"? Weeding out inferior individuals from the gene pool?
> > Why not? Moreover, who makes these decisions? Philosopher-kings?
>
> Whoever the governed consent to have govern them.
I would still like to know what "the greatest good for the greatest
number" means. Sounds kind of like Marx, or Star Trek. The problem,
or course, is who gets to decide what the "good."
> > Yes, I agree that his ideas are self-refuting...but then ultimately
> > so are yours, you just don't see it.
>
> Pose it in terms of symbolic logic. I promise I will see it, or
> point out the error(s) in the formulation.
Well, let's take the logic of naturalism for example. Recall that
naturalism attempts to account for everything on the basis that
all that exists is matter/energy and the operation of physical laws.
Premise A: All current states of matter/energy are determined by
the operation of physical laws on antecedent states
of matter/energy.
Premise B: My current beliefs can be accounted for solely on
naturalistic principles.
Premise C: Other people's beliefs can be accounted for solely on
naturalistic principles.
Conclusion D: All beliefs are pre-determined.
if (A && B && C) then D.
IOW, you cannot get from electro-chemical reactions in the grey-matter
to the notion of "true belief" and "false belief". All beliefs can
only be accounted for on naturalistic terms, therefore nobody can
say that their particular view of reality is true in the sense that
it is the actual state of affairs that obtains, but rather you
couln't help but believe what you believe, because that's just the
way the synapses fired in your brain. And if someone else holds to
a diametrically opposed view, it cannot be deemed "false" since it
too is just the result of electro-chemical reactions in their brain.
In short, if naturalism is true, it could never be known to be true.
It would be like saying the Mississippi "knows" how to get to the
ocean, while Lake Michigan does not.
And I've already anticipated your answer. You will say that
reasoning abilities are "emergent". To which I will respond,
"How?" Please elaborate.
> > > Self-organizing systems don't have to admit non-teleological basis.
> > >
> > > Science acknowledges "gosh numbers", such as "PI", "e", "G", or "The
> > > Fine Structure Constant", etc., without needing to acknowledge a
> > > non-teleological cause with a set of thermostats that can be adjusted,
> > > one of which reads "Speed of Light" or another which reads "Planck Length".
> >
> > Then I would have to ask to what end such "self-organizing systems"
> > attain? Organizing into what? For what purpose?
>
> Why does there have to be a purpose?
If you say something has a teleological basis, it has a purpose by
definition.
> > > Does it matter if an action is wrong or not, if a penalty will
> > > be assessed for the action regardless of your own personal views
> > > of right and wrong? If you want to avoid the penalty, you must
> > > act as if you believed the action were wrong, regardless of your
> > > personal beliefs in the matter.
> >
> > Of course, my answer will be, "Yes it does." I just think you are
> > not thinking high enough on the ontological scale.
>
> 8-).
>
> "Ontology recapitualates phylology".
>
> It may matter to you, personally. If it does, you with either act
> within the system, to change the mechanism whereby the action results
> in a penalty, or you will engage in civil disobedience to provide an
> example to others -- sacrificing yourself to the greater good, or you
> will declare your seperateness from society, in some way.
Yes, yes, I know. But can you explain, on your worldview, why such
disagreements should arise in the first place?
> So you will change the rule, or you will be removed from the conflict
> situation, or you will remove yourself from the conflict situation.
> No matter what you do (or the actual outcome), the conflict will be
> resolved to the satisfaction of the society.
Yes, but this is all beside the point. It is purely descriptive.
To what ends *should* society be seeking?
> > > > When we punish them, is our justification for doing so solely because
> > > > we have the guns and the will to do so?
> > >
> > > Pretty much, yes.
> >
> > So I take it you're not a libertarian...<g>
>
> Actually, I am, or at least a Strict Constitutional Constructionist,
> if you want to be technically accurate.
>
> I was recently asked to run for public office in my district by the
> Libertarian party, in fact (I declined; the suit, contacts, hair-cut,
> kiss-hands-shake-babies drill was not my cup of tea; that, and the
> party management procrastinated until too close to the registration
> window for anyone they got to have a reasonable chance of winning).
>
> Holding a philosophy, and forcing the larger society to hold a
> philosophy are two very different things, even if it's for the
> larger societies Own Good(tm). There's such a thing as social
> inertia, and societies, being made up of people, are slow to
> change. Anyone who wants a "quick fix" for what they perceive as a
> social ill is most likely deluding themselves. Societies only ever
> change one individual at a time.
To that, Amen!
Neal
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