From owner-freebsd-arch@freebsd.org Tue May 7 19:39:31 2019 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-arch@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F33481591BA3 for ; Tue, 7 May 2019 19:39:30 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from freebsd-rwg@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net) Received: from mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (mailman.ysv.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::50:5]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5F682718A2 for ; Tue, 7 May 2019 19:39:30 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from freebsd-rwg@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net) Received: by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) id 1C7781591BA2; Tue, 7 May 2019 19:39:30 +0000 (UTC) Delivered-To: arch@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0AE2F1591BA1 for ; Tue, 7 May 2019 19:39:30 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from freebsd-rwg@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net) Received: from gndrsh.dnsmgr.net (br1.CN84in.dnsmgr.net [69.59.192.140]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 77BE87189E; Tue, 7 May 2019 19:39:29 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from freebsd-rwg@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net) Received: from gndrsh.dnsmgr.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by gndrsh.dnsmgr.net (8.13.3/8.13.3) with ESMTP id x47JdPHk013096; Tue, 7 May 2019 12:39:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from freebsd-rwg@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net) Received: (from freebsd-rwg@localhost) by gndrsh.dnsmgr.net (8.13.3/8.13.3/Submit) id x47JdPQA013095; Tue, 7 May 2019 12:39:25 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from freebsd-rwg) From: "Rodney W. Grimes" Message-Id: <201905071939.x47JdPQA013095@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net> Subject: Re: Deprecating crypto algorithms in the kernel In-Reply-To: To: cem@freebsd.org Date: Tue, 7 May 2019 12:39:25 -0700 (PDT) CC: John Baldwin , "freebsd-arch@freebsd.org" X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4ME+ PL121h (25)] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 77BE87189E X-Spamd-Bar: ------ Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-6.96 / 15.00]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-1.00)[-1.000,0]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000,0]; REPLY(-4.00)[]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.96)[-0.965,0] X-BeenThere: freebsd-arch@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussion related to FreeBSD architecture List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 07 May 2019 19:39:31 -0000 > On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 6:14 PM John Baldwin wrote: > > I have been doing some work off and on to address some of the shortcomings > > in the in-kernel open crypto framework. ? some of the currently supported > > algorithms have known weaknesses or are deprecated in RFCs, by the authors, > > etc. I would like to take a stab at trimming some of this for FreeBSD 13. > > For an initial proposal, ? > > > > This adds runtime deprecation notices in the kernel when using deprecated > > algorithms for IPsec (according to RFC 8221), and Kerberos GSS (RFCs 6649 > > and 8429). It then also adds deprecation notices for a few algorithms in > > GELI. For GELI, the current patches should refuse to create new volumes > > with these algorithms and warn when mounting an existing volume. > > > > The current optimistic goal would be to merge all the warning back to 11 > > and 12 and then remove support for these algorithms outright in 13.0. > > For GELI in particular, I recognize this is somewhat painful as it means > > doing a dump/restore if you've created volumes with affected algorithms. > > OTOH, these algorithms are not the current defaults. > > Nor were they ever ? the default has always been an aes-based > algorithm since the initial import of GELI in 2005 (r148456). > > > Finally, I've added warnings to /dev/crypto to warn if userland tries to > > create new sessions for algorithms that no longer have any non-deprecated > > in-kernel consumers. > > We've discussed this offline, but I just wanted to remark on the > public lists that I'm all in favor of removing crufty bad crypto > algorithms, and your chosen list seems to meet that criteria while > being a conservative change. Please kill 'em. :-) Does doing this in any way break TCPMD5, which is extensively still in use for BGP sessions. Breaking that would probably be a bad idea. -- Rod Grimes rgrimes@freebsd.org