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Date:      Sat, 11 Jan 2020 15:06:07 +0000 (UTC)
From:      Kyle Evans <kevans@FreeBSD.org>
To:        src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable-12@freebsd.org
Subject:   svn commit: r356634 - in stable: 11/sys/compat/linux 11/sys/sys 11/sys/vm 12/sys/compat/linux 12/sys/sys 12/sys/vm
Message-ID:  <202001111506.00BF67bG004769@repo.freebsd.org>

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Author: kevans
Date: Sat Jan 11 15:06:06 2020
New Revision: 356634
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/356634

Log:
  MFC r356359-r356360: kern_mmap: add fpcheck invariant for linux_mmap
  
  r356359:
  kern_mmap: add a variant that allows caller to inspect fp
  
  Linux mmap rejects mmap() on a write-only file with EACCES.
  linux_mmap_common currently does a fun dance to grab the fp associated with
  the passed in fd, validates it, then drops the reference and calls into
  kern_mmap(). Doing so is perhaps both fragile and premature; there's still
  plenty of chance for the request to get rejected with a more appropriate
  error, and it's prone to a race where the file we ultimately mmap has
  changed after it drops its referenced.
  
  This change alleviates the need to do this by providing a kern_mmap variant
  that allows the caller to inspect the fp just before calling into the fileop
  layer. The callback takes flags, prot, and maxprot as one could imagine
  scenarios where any of these, in conjunction with the file itself, may
  influence a caller's decision.
  
  The file type check in the linux compat layer has been removed; EINVAL is
  seemingly not an appropriate response to the file not being a vnode or
  device. The fileop layer will reject the operation with ENODEV if it's not
  supported, which more closely matches the common linux description of
  mmap(2) return values.
  
  If we discover that we're allowing an mmap() on a file type that Linux
  normally wouldn't, we should restrict those explicitly.
  
  r356360:
  kern_mmap: restore character deleted in transit

Modified:
  stable/12/sys/compat/linux/linux_mmap.c
  stable/12/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h
  stable/12/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c
Directory Properties:
  stable/12/   (props changed)

Changes in other areas also in this revision:
Modified:
  stable/11/sys/compat/linux/linux_mmap.c
  stable/11/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h
  stable/11/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c
Directory Properties:
  stable/11/   (props changed)

Modified: stable/12/sys/compat/linux/linux_mmap.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/12/sys/compat/linux/linux_mmap.c	Sat Jan 11 12:02:16 2020	(r356633)
+++ stable/12/sys/compat/linux/linux_mmap.c	Sat Jan 11 15:06:06 2020	(r356634)
@@ -62,7 +62,17 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
 static void linux_fixup_prot(struct thread *td, int *prot);
 #endif
 
+static int
+linux_mmap_check_fp(struct file *fp, int flags, int prot, int maxprot)
+{
 
+	/* Linux mmap() just fails for O_WRONLY files */
+	if ((fp->f_flag & FREAD) == 0)
+		return (EACCES);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
 int
 linux_mmap_common(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t len, int prot,
     int flags, int fd, off_t pos)
@@ -117,31 +127,6 @@ linux_mmap_common(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, s
 
 	/* Linux does not check file descriptor when MAP_ANONYMOUS is set. */
 	fd = (bsd_flags & MAP_ANON) ? -1 : fd;
-	if (fd != -1) {
-		/*
-		 * Linux follows Solaris mmap(2) description:
-		 * The file descriptor fildes is opened with
-		 * read permission, regardless of the
-		 * protection options specified.
-		 */
-
-		error = fget(td, fd, &cap_mmap_rights, &fp);
-		if (error != 0)
-			return (error);
-		if (fp->f_type != DTYPE_VNODE && fp->f_type != DTYPE_DEV) {
-			fdrop(fp, td);
-			return (EINVAL);
-		}
-
-		/* Linux mmap() just fails for O_WRONLY files */
-		if (!(fp->f_flag & FREAD)) {
-			fdrop(fp, td);
-			return (EACCES);
-		}
-
-		fdrop(fp, td);
-	}
-
 	if (flags & LINUX_MAP_GROWSDOWN) {
 		/*
 		 * The Linux MAP_GROWSDOWN option does not limit auto
@@ -211,13 +196,15 @@ linux_mmap_common(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, s
 	 */
 	if (addr != 0 && (bsd_flags & MAP_FIXED) == 0 &&
 	    (bsd_flags & MAP_EXCL) == 0) {
-		error = kern_mmap(td, addr, len, prot,
-		    bsd_flags | MAP_FIXED | MAP_EXCL, fd, pos);
+		error = kern_mmap_fpcheck(td, addr, len, prot,
+		    bsd_flags | MAP_FIXED | MAP_EXCL, fd, pos,
+		    linux_mmap_check_fp);
 		if (error == 0)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	error = kern_mmap(td, addr, len, prot, bsd_flags, fd, pos);
+	error = kern_mmap_fpcheck(td, addr, len, prot, bsd_flags, fd, pos,
+	    linux_mmap_check_fp);
 out:
 	LINUX_CTR2(mmap2, "return: %d (%p)", error, td->td_retval[0]);
 

Modified: stable/12/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h
==============================================================================
--- stable/12/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h	Sat Jan 11 12:02:16 2020	(r356633)
+++ stable/12/sys/sys/syscallsubr.h	Sat Jan 11 15:06:06 2020	(r356634)
@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ struct stat;
 struct thr_param;
 struct uio;
 
+typedef int (*mmap_check_fp_fn)(struct file *, int, int, int);
+
 int	kern___getcwd(struct thread *td, char *buf, enum uio_seg bufseg,
 	    size_t buflen, size_t path_max);
 int	kern_accept(struct thread *td, int s, struct sockaddr **name,
@@ -175,6 +177,9 @@ int	kern_mlock(struct proc *proc, struct ucred *cred, 
 	    size_t len);
 int	kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t size, int prot,
 	    int flags, int fd, off_t pos);
+int	kern_mmap_fpcheck(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t len,
+	    int prot, int flags, int fd, off_t pos,
+	    mmap_check_fp_fn check_fp_fn);
 int	kern_mprotect(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr, size_t size, int prot);
 int	kern_msgctl(struct thread *, int, int, struct msqid_ds *);
 int	kern_msgrcv(struct thread *, int, void *, size_t, long, int, long *);

Modified: stable/12/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c
==============================================================================
--- stable/12/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c	Sat Jan 11 12:02:16 2020	(r356633)
+++ stable/12/sys/vm/vm_mmap.c	Sat Jan 11 15:06:06 2020	(r356634)
@@ -185,6 +185,18 @@ int
 kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot, int flags,
     int fd, off_t pos)
 {
+
+	return (kern_mmap_fpcheck(td, addr0, size, prot, flags, fd, pos, NULL));
+}
+
+/*
+ * When mmap'ing a file, check_fp_fn may be used for the caller to do any
+ * last-minute validation based on the referenced file in a non-racy way.
+ */
+int
+kern_mmap_fpcheck(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t size, int prot,
+    int flags, int fd, off_t pos, mmap_check_fp_fn check_fp_fn)
+{
 	struct vmspace *vms;
 	struct file *fp;
 	struct proc *p;
@@ -362,7 +374,11 @@ kern_mmap(struct thread *td, uintptr_t addr0, size_t s
 			error = EINVAL;
 			goto done;
 		}
-
+		if (check_fp_fn != NULL) {
+			error = check_fp_fn(fp, prot, cap_maxprot, flags);
+			if (error != 0)
+				goto done;
+		}
 		/* This relies on VM_PROT_* matching PROT_*. */
 		error = fo_mmap(fp, &vms->vm_map, &addr, size, prot,
 		    cap_maxprot, flags, pos, td);



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