From owner-svn-src-stable@FreeBSD.ORG Tue Jun 12 12:10:12 2012 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-stable@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [69.147.83.52]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF161106567A; Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:10:11 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from bz@FreeBSD.org) Received: from svn.freebsd.org (svn.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::2c]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9DE98FC0A; Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:10:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from svn.freebsd.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by svn.freebsd.org (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id q5CCAB41052390; Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:10:11 GMT (envelope-from bz@svn.freebsd.org) Received: (from bz@localhost) by svn.freebsd.org (8.14.4/8.14.4/Submit) id q5CCABtB052386; Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:10:11 GMT (envelope-from bz@svn.freebsd.org) Message-Id: <201206121210.q5CCABtB052386@svn.freebsd.org> From: "Bjoern A. Zeeb" Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:10:11 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable-7@freebsd.org X-SVN-Group: stable-7 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Cc: Subject: svn commit: r236953 - head/sys/amd64/amd64 releng/7.4 releng/7.4/contrib/bind9/lib/dns releng/7.4/sys/amd64/amd64 releng/7.4/sys/conf releng/8.1 releng/8.1/contrib/bind9/lib/dns releng/8.1/sys/amd6... X-BeenThere: svn-src-stable@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for all the -stable branches of the src tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Jun 2012 12:10:12 -0000 Author: bz Date: Tue Jun 12 12:10:10 2012 New Revision: 236953 URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/236953 Log: Fix a problem where zero-length RDATA fields can cause named(8) to crash. [12:03] Correct a privilege escalation when returning from kernel if running FreeBSD/amd64 on non-AMD processors. [12:04] Fix reference count errors in IPv6 code. [EN-12:02] Security: CVE-2012-1667 Security: FreeBSD-SA-12:03.bind Security: CVE-2012-0217 Security: FreeBSD-SA-12:04.sysret Security: FreeBSD-EN-12:02.ipv6refcount Approved by: so (simon, bz) Modified: stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c stable/7/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c Changes in other areas also in this revision: Modified: head/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c releng/7.4/UPDATING releng/7.4/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c releng/7.4/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c releng/7.4/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c releng/7.4/sys/conf/newvers.sh releng/8.1/UPDATING releng/8.1/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c releng/8.1/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c releng/8.1/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c releng/8.1/sys/conf/newvers.sh releng/8.1/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c releng/8.1/sys/netinet6/in6.c releng/8.1/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c releng/8.2/UPDATING releng/8.2/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c releng/8.2/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c releng/8.2/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c releng/8.2/sys/conf/newvers.sh releng/8.2/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c releng/8.2/sys/netinet6/in6.c releng/8.2/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c releng/8.3/UPDATING releng/8.3/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c releng/8.3/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c releng/8.3/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c releng/8.3/sys/conf/newvers.sh releng/8.3/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c releng/8.3/sys/netinet6/in6.c releng/8.3/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c releng/9.0/UPDATING releng/9.0/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c releng/9.0/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c releng/9.0/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c releng/9.0/sys/conf/newvers.sh releng/9.0/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c releng/9.0/sys/netinet6/in6.c releng/9.0/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c stable/8/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c stable/9/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c Modified: stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c ============================================================================== --- stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c Tue Jun 12 11:08:51 2012 (r236952) +++ stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c Tue Jun 12 12:10:10 2012 (r236953) @@ -334,8 +334,8 @@ dns_rdata_compare(const dns_rdata_t *rda REQUIRE(rdata1 != NULL); REQUIRE(rdata2 != NULL); - REQUIRE(rdata1->data != NULL); - REQUIRE(rdata2->data != NULL); + REQUIRE(rdata1->length == 0 || rdata1->data != NULL); + REQUIRE(rdata2->length == 0 || rdata2->data != NULL); REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata1)); REQUIRE(DNS_RDATA_VALIDFLAGS(rdata2)); Modified: stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c ============================================================================== --- stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c Tue Jun 12 11:08:51 2012 (r236952) +++ stable/7/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c Tue Jun 12 12:10:10 2012 (r236953) @@ -128,6 +128,11 @@ isc_result_t dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, isc_mem_t *mctx, isc_region_t *region, unsigned int reservelen) { + /* + * Use &removed as a sentinal pointer for duplicate + * rdata as rdata.data == NULL is valid. + */ + static unsigned char removed; struct xrdata *x; unsigned char *rawbuf; #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED @@ -166,6 +171,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_ INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); dns_rdata_init(&x[i].rdata); dns_rdataset_current(rdataset, &x[i].rdata); + INSIST(x[i].rdata.data != &removed); #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED x[i].order = i; #endif @@ -198,8 +204,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_ */ for (i = 1; i < nalloc; i++) { if (compare_rdata(&x[i-1].rdata, &x[i].rdata) == 0) { - x[i-1].rdata.data = NULL; - x[i-1].rdata.length = 0; + x[i-1].rdata.data = &removed; #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED /* * Preserve the least order so A, B, A -> A, B @@ -275,7 +280,7 @@ dns_rdataslab_fromrdataset(dns_rdataset_ #endif for (i = 0; i < nalloc; i++) { - if (x[i].rdata.data == NULL) + if (x[i].rdata.data == &removed) continue; #if DNS_RDATASET_FIXED offsettable[x[i].order] = rawbuf - offsetbase; Modified: stable/7/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c ============================================================================== --- stable/7/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c Tue Jun 12 11:08:51 2012 (r236952) +++ stable/7/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c Tue Jun 12 12:10:10 2012 (r236953) @@ -972,6 +972,23 @@ syscall(struct trapframe *frame) /* * Traced syscall. */ + + /* + * If the user-supplied value of %rip is not a canonical + * address, then some CPUs will trigger a ring 0 #GP during + * the sysret instruction. However, the fault handler would + * execute with the user's %gs and %rsp in ring 0 which would + * not be safe. Instead, preemptively kill the thread with a + * SIGBUS. + */ + if (td->td_frame->tf_rip >= VM_MAXUSER_ADDRESS) { + ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi); + ksi.ksi_signo = SIGBUS; + ksi.ksi_code = BUS_OBJERR; + ksi.ksi_trapno = T_PROTFLT; + ksi.ksi_addr = (void *)td->td_frame->tf_rip; + trapsignal(td, &ksi); + } if (orig_tf_rflags & PSL_T) { frame->tf_rflags &= ~PSL_T; ksiginfo_init_trap(&ksi);