From owner-svn-src-all@freebsd.org Sun Jun 3 05:08:45 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-all@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 785CEFF478C for ; Sun, 3 Jun 2018 05:08:45 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from eadler@freebsd.org) Received: from smtp.freebsd.org (unknown [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::24b:4]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23FA86F338 for ; Sun, 3 Jun 2018 05:08:45 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from eadler@freebsd.org) Received: from mail-yb0-f182.google.com (mail-yb0-f182.google.com [209.85.213.182]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.gmail.com", Issuer "Google Internet Authority G2" (verified OK)) (Authenticated sender: eadler) by smtp.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E21F227F67 for ; Sun, 3 Jun 2018 05:08:44 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from eadler@freebsd.org) Received: by mail-yb0-f182.google.com with SMTP id m137-v6so7720603ybm.6 for ; Sat, 02 Jun 2018 22:08:44 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: APt69E3Vb387mERA4nPPP2BuaQkItwhd6rSJHv9qjXCyZDMoO5uK9ZaZ xLW5dnowGo9pGKhnt1d/JIY8XMI/mIt/uQPiadwEQQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ADUXVKLDdXmY9SOq50CtxxE+nnk0QbREk2V0LWceBILmv9Pu/dGY30s8+A93PPDQFHO/V0qUx5QRf+cv6XsJcAvp+gI= X-Received: by 2002:a5b:64c:: with SMTP id o12-v6mr5873213ybq.460.1528002524399; Sat, 02 Jun 2018 22:08:44 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 2002:a25:ef50:0:0:0:0:0 with HTTP; Sat, 2 Jun 2018 22:08:13 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <201806022356.w52NuiFK088665@pdx.rh.CN85.dnsmgr.net> References: <201806022206.w52M6S98020830@repo.freebsd.org> <201806022356.w52NuiFK088665@pdx.rh.CN85.dnsmgr.net> From: Eitan Adler Date: Sat, 2 Jun 2018 22:08:13 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: svn commit: r334543 - head/usr.bin/top To: "Rodney W. Grimes" Cc: src-committers , svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-BeenThere: svn-src-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: "SVN commit messages for the entire src tree \(except for " user" and " projects" \)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 03 Jun 2018 05:08:45 -0000 On 2 June 2018 at 16:56, Rodney W. Grimes wrote: >> Author: eadler >> Date: Sat Jun 2 22:06:27 2018 >> New Revision: 334543 >> URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/334543 >> >> Log: >> top(1): chdir to / as init; remove unneeded comment >> >> - chdir to / to allow unmounting of wd >> - remove warning about running top(1) as setuid. If this is a concern we >> should just drop privs instead. >> >> Modified: >> head/usr.bin/top/machine.c >> head/usr.bin/top/top.c >> >> Modified: head/usr.bin/top/machine.c >> ============================================================================== >> --- head/usr.bin/top/machine.c Sat Jun 2 21:50:00 2018 (r334542) >> +++ head/usr.bin/top/machine.c Sat Jun 2 22:06:27 2018 (r334543) >> @@ -1613,11 +1613,6 @@ compare_ivcsw(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) >> /* >> * proc_owner(pid) - returns the uid that owns process "pid", or -1 if >> * the process does not exist. >> - * It is EXTREMELY IMPORTANT that this function work correctly. >> - * If top runs setuid root (as in SVR4), then this function >> - * is the only thing that stands in the way of a serious >> - * security problem. It validates requests for the "kill" >> - * and "renice" commands. >> */ >> >> int >> >> Modified: head/usr.bin/top/top.c >> ============================================================================== >> --- head/usr.bin/top/top.c Sat Jun 2 21:50:00 2018 (r334542) >> +++ head/usr.bin/top/top.c Sat Jun 2 22:06:27 2018 (r334543) >> @@ -260,6 +260,15 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) >> #define CMD_order 26 >> #define CMD_pid 27 >> >> + /* >> + * Since top(1) is often long running and >> + * doesn't typically care about where its running from >> + * chdir to the root to allow unmounting of its >> + * originall wd. Failure is alright as this is >> + * just a courtesy for users. >> + */ >> + chdir("/"); >> + > > Bad side effect of doing that is it is not hard to get a "core" > from top when run as a user, as it is going to try to write > to /, and it probably does not have permission for that. Another person made the point that other similar applications don't do this, so I just reverted it. thanks! -- Eitan Adler Source, Ports, Doc committer Bugmeister, Ports Security teams