From owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Tue Oct 14 16:34:21 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [8.8.178.115]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA018517 for ; Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:34:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.michaelwlucas.com (mail.michaelwlucas.com [108.61.84.26]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 840AC374 for ; Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:34:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail.michaelwlucas.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.michaelwlucas.com (8.14.7/8.14.7) with ESMTP id s9EGY8XD026515; Tue, 14 Oct 2014 12:34:09 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from mwlucas@mail.michaelwlucas.com) Received: (from mwlucas@localhost) by mail.michaelwlucas.com (8.14.7/8.14.7/Submit) id s9EGY8Qv026514; Tue, 14 Oct 2014 12:34:08 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from mwlucas) Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 12:34:05 -0400 From: "Michael W. Lucas" To: RW Subject: Re: GBDE not protecting the user Message-ID: <20141014163405.GA26488@mail.michaelwlucas.com> References: <20141010215842.GA6717@mail.michaelwlucas.com> <20141011113008.705ba16d@X220.alogt.com> <20141011074412.GA9432@mail.michaelwlucas.com> <20141013132926.164cece9@gumby.homeunix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20141013132926.164cece9@gumby.homeunix.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.0 required=5.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on mail.michaelwlucas.com Cc: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18-1 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2014 16:34:21 -0000 On Mon, Oct 13, 2014 at 01:29:26PM +0100, RW wrote: > You can overwrite the geli metadata on the end of the provider with dd. > Preferably the whole partition if you want to be sure because anyone > that's ever had access to the disk could have copied the metadata. > > If you are going to use a passphrase I'd recommend geli which has > password strengthening. If Mallory is holding a gun to my head, I want the computer to say "The passphrase entered by the user is correct, but the on-disk decryption keys no longer exist. The user has cooperated fully. Please don't shoot him." GELI does not do this. It's designed for a different threat model. That's not a problem, or a weakness. GBDE does. Or, rather, it's supposed to. Hence this bug report. It's an unusual use case, yes. But the people who need this functionality REALLY need it. ==ml -- Michael W. Lucas - mwlucas@michaelwlucas.com, Twitter @mwlauthor http://www.MichaelWLucas.com/, http://blather.MichaelWLucas.com/