From owner-freebsd-stable@FreeBSD.ORG Wed Jan 15 19:26:22 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6091ABC5 for ; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 19:26:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp67.ord1c.emailsrvr.com (smtp67.ord1c.emailsrvr.com [108.166.43.67]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3A7211D7C for ; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 19:26:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.relay.ord1c.emailsrvr.com (SMTP Server) with ESMTP id CECB8148141; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 14:26:14 -0500 (EST) X-Virus-Scanned: OK Received: by smtp1.relay.ord1c.emailsrvr.com (Authenticated sender: adam.strohl-AT-ateamsystems.com) with ESMTPSA id 55CB8148172; Wed, 15 Jan 2014 14:26:09 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <52D6E0D3.9060100@ateamsystems.com> Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2014 02:26:11 +0700 From: Adam Strohl User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.2.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Mike Tancsa , Darren Pilgrim , freebsd-stable@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Errata Notice FreeBSD-EN-14:01.random References: <201401142011.s0EKBoi7082738@freefall.freebsd.org> <52D6BF9C.8070405@bluerosetech.com> <52D6D5C7.80200@sentex.net> <52D6D93F.7020600@bluerosetech.com> <52D6DC9C.3060007@sentex.net> In-Reply-To: <52D6DC9C.3060007@sentex.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-BeenThere: freebsd-stable@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17 Precedence: list List-Id: Production branch of FreeBSD source code List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2014 19:26:22 -0000 On 1/16/2014 2:08, Mike Tancsa wrote: > On 1/15/2014 1:53 PM, Darren Pilgrim wrote: >> >> Yes, that's an obvious consequence of a compromised RNG; but that's not >> what I was asking. I'm asking how the attacker could compromise the >> hardware RNG without also obtaining effectively unfettered access to the >> entire system. > > I think the fear is at manufacturing time. i.e. the suspicion is that > some govt agency asked a design weakness be built in. Whether thats > true or a reasonable fear or not, I am not one to say.... To 2nd this, it is assumed at this point that this has happened: http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/12/we-cannot-trust-intel-and-vias-chip-based-crypto-freebsd-developers-say/