From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Mon Sep 26 20:48:16 2016 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 52955BEAD2B for ; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 20:48:16 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: from smtp.des.no (smtp.des.no [194.63.250.102]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D9A9405 for ; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 20:48:16 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: from desk.des.no (smtp.des.no [194.63.250.102]) by smtp.des.no (Postfix) with ESMTP id 25D9B5522; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 20:48:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: by desk.des.no (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 3ADDC4346B; Mon, 26 Sep 2016 22:48:12 +0200 (CEST) From: =?utf-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=C3=B8rgrav?= To: freebsd-security Cc: RW Subject: Re: Two Dumb Questions References: <32084.1474872154@segfault.tristatelogic.com> <20160926135238.6296ddc2@gumby.homeunix.com> Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 22:48:12 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20160926135238.6296ddc2@gumby.homeunix.com> (RW via freebsd-security's message of "Mon, 26 Sep 2016 13:52:38 +0100") Message-ID: <86r3868k1f.fsf@desk.des.no> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.5 (berkeley-unix) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 20:48:16 -0000 RW writes: > There's a simple paint analogy here: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie=E2=80=93Hellman_key_exchange > > that illustrates how it's possible to exchange a shared secret without > an eavesdropper knowing what it is. The shared secret can then be used > for symmetric encryption using something like AES. SSL / TLS didn't commonly use DH, much less *safe* DH, until fairly recently, and DH alone is not very useful. You need either a shared secret or trusted key pairs to authenticate either or both endpoints. > Actual protocols use public key cryptography so it can be established > that the exchange is end to end, and not broken into two separate > exchanges. Assuming you can trust the public key, which is what CAs are for, but CAs can be hacked, deceived or coerced. DES --=20 Dag-Erling Sm=C3=B8rgrav - des@des.no