Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2002 17:43:04 -0800 From: "Crist J. Clark" <cjc@FreeBSD.ORG> To: Jason Stone <jason-fbsd-security@shalott.net> Cc: security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: make world and setuid bits Message-ID: <20020328174304.L97841@blossom.cjclark.org> In-Reply-To: <20020328161518.R5333-100000@walter>; from jason-fbsd-security@shalott.net on Thu, Mar 28, 2002 at 04:37:54PM -0800 References: <20020328121850.D97841@blossom.cjclark.org> <20020328161518.R5333-100000@walter>
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On Thu, Mar 28, 2002 at 04:37:54PM -0800, Jason Stone wrote:
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> > > Are there make variables that can be set to prevent "make world" from
> > > installing binaries as setuid? Currently, I always run something like
> > > "find -perms -4000 | xargs chmod u-s" after doing a make world, but this
> > > seems inelegant, prone to human error, and dangerous as there's a
> > > (potentially quite long) period in which there are still many setuid
> > > binaries....
> > >
> > > make options to allow the prevention of "setuid root", "all setuid",
> > > or "all setuid and all setgid" would be nice.
> >
> > For the vast majority of users, having no setuid binaries is a really,
> > really bad idea from a security standpoint. It forces you to do
> > everything as root.
>
> 1) For server machines that have no non-root interactive users, the
> "no setuid or setgid at all" option is a very good idea.
Some sites may use this policy, but I would never like it. It requires
direct logins as root.
> 2) Even on machines that do have interactive users, there are many
> environments where it's possible to turn off most of the setuid root
> bits - I see no reason to let users on a shared machine run ping or
> traceroute, rsh/rlogin should never be used at all, I can get away with
> not providing crontab, most servers don't have printers attached and
> therefore have no use for lpr, etc.
passwd(1), at(1), crontab(1), login(1), su(1), some or most of those
would be required for almost any multiuser installation.
> So, given that there's decidedly some utility in doing this, is there any
> reason to not do so?
<insert the ususal arguments against rampant featurism here>
<insert the ususal comparison to M$ OS featurism to needlessly incite
emotional responses>
If you can come up with some reasonably non-obtrusive patches to the
build to control this with some make.conf(5) knobs, we can have a look
at the practicallity.
--
Crist J. Clark | cjclark@alum.mit.edu
| cjclark@jhu.edu
http://people.freebsd.org/~cjc/ | cjc@freebsd.org
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