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From: "Bjoern A. Zeeb" <bz@FreeBSD.org>
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2009 17:48:51 +0000 (UTC)
To: cvs-src-old@freebsd.org
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Subject: cvs commit: src/sys/kern init_main.c kern_exec.c
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bz          2009-10-02 17:48:51 UTC

  FreeBSD src repository

  Modified files:
    sys/kern             init_main.c kern_exec.c 
  Log:
  SVN rev 197711 on 2009-10-02 17:48:51Z by bz
  
  Add a mitigation feature that will prevent user mappings at
  virtual address 0, limiting the ability to convert a kernel
  NULL pointer dereference into a privilege escalation attack.
  
  If the sysctl is set to 0 a newly started process will not be able
  to map anything in the address range of the first page (0 to PAGE_SIZE).
  This is the default. Already running processes are not affected by this.
  
  You can either change the sysctl or the tunable from loader in case
  you need to map at a virtual address of 0, for example when running
  any of the extinct species of a set of a.out binaries, vm86 emulation, ..
  In that case set security.bsd.map_at_zero="1".
  
  Superseeds:             r197537
  In collaboration with:  jhb, kib, alc
  
  Revision  Changes    Path
  1.306     +5 -0      src/sys/kern/init_main.c
  1.339     +12 -3     src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c