From owner-freebsd-security@freebsd.org Wed Dec 13 00:37:17 2017 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3F44EE8B1F4 for ; Wed, 13 Dec 2017 00:37:17 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from peter@wemm.org) Received: from smtp2.wemm.org (smtp2.wemm.org [192.203.228.78]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "smtp2.wemm.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2904A7AAA0 for ; Wed, 13 Dec 2017 00:37:16 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from peter@wemm.org) Received: from overcee.wemm.org (canning.wemm.org [192.203.228.65]) by smtp2.wemm.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1BF40987; Tue, 12 Dec 2017 16:37:10 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=wemm.org; s=m20140428; t=1513125430; bh=WbqV3hhKXxY72xfahTuI8a+53TYOJG129vaqNdKAkv4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=jSxPx4uvnXq3/M+ui2pHziKZha8Vi4xpddNoSX0wYEbmm1J3KlD8UVYO0XXv2iyO6 H90IVI5qIi2OnUElID3JgaSGlmYSNvPbjjqkM6Vy4jIBjfDMt+8KGkL+YKK630HqxQ xv1yNbd+0/9Y38nayyXXdsfsvPdcDmyxXcqUfZUs= From: Peter Wemm To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Cc: Yuri , Eugene Grosbein , Igor Mozolevsky , RW Subject: Re: http subversion URLs should be discontinued in favor of https URLs Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 16:37:05 -0800 Message-ID: <3138231.uiVPfnS2VB@overcee.wemm.org> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.10 (FreeBSD/12.0-CURRENT; KDE/4.14.30; amd64; ; ) In-Reply-To: <6c9d028c-ac1c-3fc6-8ea2-7ee22c7ffbe8@rawbw.com> References: <97f76231-dace-10c4-cab2-08e5e0d792b5@rawbw.com> <5A303453.9050705@grosbein.net> <6c9d028c-ac1c-3fc6-8ea2-7ee22c7ffbe8@rawbw.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="nextPart3304951.O0M3ReN2mj"; micalg="pgp-sha256"; protocol="application/pgp-signature" X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.25 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 00:37:17 -0000 --nextPart3304951.O0M3ReN2mj Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" On Tuesday, December 12, 2017 04:13:48 PM Yuri wrote: > On 12/12/17 11:56, Eugene Grosbein wrote: > > https://wiki.squid-cache.org/Features/SslPeekAndSplice > >=20 > > You either ignore MITM and proceed with connection anyway or have n= o > > connectivity via this channel at all. > When the user sees that SSL/TLS is stripped, this isn't a vulnerabili= ty > of the protocol. User can make a choice to use such connection anyway= . > There are command line options like this for some commands, and the > choice in the browser. >=20 > Compare this with https using compromised by government CA, when the > user doesn't have any way of knowing about MITM. So https+private CA > stands secure. I think you're missing the point. It is a sad reality that SSL/TLS cor= porate=20 (and ISP) MITM exists and is enforced on a larger scale than we'd like.= But=20 it is there, and when mandated/enforced you have to go through the MITM= =20 appliance, or not connect at all. Private CA's generally break those=20= appliances - an unfortunate FreeBSD user in this situation is cut off. = How is=20 this better? =2D-=20 Peter Wemm - peter@wemm.org; peter@FreeBSD.org; peter@yahoo-inc.com; KI= 6FJV UTF-8: for when a ' or ... just won\342\200\231t do\342\200\246 --nextPart3304951.O0M3ReN2mj Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: This is a digitally signed message part. Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAABCAAdFiEEBgrA0Vr/vfNVuPoUNdaXCeyAngQFAlowdjEACgkQNdaXCeyA ngT82QgAkyjz1tadlJXan1RXqrqorQwFRV2wiilVQP9MQIuAUr3tCwdm9GF0iFYB IQ78I3Fy+nKCuxiIkX+D7LD06SgkGKnMgG+m5FlO8W5tGSe2LC4RbA+lj+Xb9A6V y81TcWDFutM1TzX7OVjYlV33H5trqmL4tUqBvhBIxEmDtpokFp1wx/ojzj2vi3T7 6PlpN7zkHkQw3pT0Lh/Qh5SEy2XNv1HhstHwpHgEnRPJ2lB48hvPRAP9cteFILAF SjSwDNxNUITYwPHZPQINKTQQop+X0I0qVsKDRFGS1Sd0Gp05dYyMfo2qk+rkvuRh lCvn21MmAc+wEwLZKQYZ5QYnW/4i9A== =k6Nd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --nextPart3304951.O0M3ReN2mj--