From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Sun Oct 2 22:08:53 2005 Return-Path: X-Original-To: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org Delivered-To: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C741116A41F for ; Sun, 2 Oct 2005 22:08:53 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from truckman@FreeBSD.org) Received: from gw.catspoiler.org (217-ip-163.nccn.net [209.79.217.163]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6938443D46 for ; Sun, 2 Oct 2005 22:08:53 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from truckman@FreeBSD.org) Received: from FreeBSD.org (mousie.catspoiler.org [192.168.101.2]) by gw.catspoiler.org (8.13.3/8.13.3) with ESMTP id j92M8joS016722; Sun, 2 Oct 2005 15:08:49 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from truckman@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <200510022208.j92M8joS016722@gw.catspoiler.org> Date: Sun, 2 Oct 2005 15:08:45 -0700 (PDT) From: Don Lewis To: brett@lariat.org In-Reply-To: <6.2.3.4.2.20051002153930.07a50528@localhost> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/plain; charset=us-ascii Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: Repeated attacks via SSH X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 02 Oct 2005 22:08:53 -0000 On 2 Oct, Brett Glass wrote: > Everyone: > > We're starting to see a rash of password guessing attacks via SSH > on all of our exposed BSD servers which are running an SSH daemon. > They're coming from multiple addresses, which makes us suspect that > they're being carried out by a network of "bots" rather than a single attacker. > > But wait... there's more. The interesting thing about these attacks > is that the user IDs for which passwords are being guessed aren't > coming from a completely fixed list. Besides guessing at the > passwords for root, toor, news, admin, test, guest, webmaster, > sshd, and mysql, the bots are also trying to get into our mail > exchangers via user IDs which are the actual names of users for > whom the machines receive mail. In one case, we saw an attempt to > use the name of a user who hadn't been on for years but whose > address was published ONCE (according to Google and AltaVista) on > the Net. Since the attackers are not guessing at hundreds of > invalid user names, the only conclusion we can draw is that when > one of the bots attacks a mail server, it quickly tries to harvest > e-mail addresses from the server's domain from the Net and then > tries them, in the hope that those users (a) are enabled for SSH > and (b) have weak passwords. > > SSH is enabled by default in most BSD-ish operating systems, and > this makes us a bigger target for these bots than users of OSes > that don't come with SSH (not that they're not more vulnerable in > other ways!). Therefore, it's strongly recommended that, where > practical, everyone limit SSH logins to the minimum possible number > of users via the "AllowUsers" directive. We also have a log monitor > that watches the logs (/var/log/auth.log in particular) and > blackholes hosts that seem to be trying to break in via SSH. It's also a good idea to only allow public key authentication from remote hosts. This avoids the risks of password guessing and password capture by shoulder surfers or key loggers.