From owner-cvs-all Mon Jul 17 5:23:10 2000 Delivered-To: cvs-all@freebsd.org Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.FreeBSD.ORG [204.216.27.21]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EE40037B90C; Mon, 17 Jul 2000 05:23:04 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from markm@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from markm@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.9.3/8.9.2) id FAA85311; Mon, 17 Jul 2000 05:23:05 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from markm@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <200007171223.FAA85311@freefall.freebsd.org> From: Mark Murray Date: Mon, 17 Jul 2000 05:23:04 -0700 (PDT) To: cvs-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org Subject: cvs commit: src/sys/sys random.h src/sys/dev/randomdev randomdev.c yarrow.c X-FreeBSD-CVS-Branch: HEAD Sender: owner-cvs-all@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.ORG markm 2000/07/17 05:23:04 PDT Modified files: sys/sys random.h sys/dev/randomdev randomdev.c yarrow.c Log: Add randomness write functionality. This does absolutely nothing for entropy estimation, but causes an immediate reseed after the input (read in sizeof(u_int64_t) chunks) is "harvested". This will be used in the reboot "reseeder", coming in another commit. This can be used very effectively at any time you think your randomness is compromised; something like # (ps -gauxwww; netstat -an; dmesg; vmstat -c10 1) > /dev/random will give the attacker something to think about. Revision Changes Path 1.23 +2 -2 src/sys/sys/random.h 1.8 +2 -2 src/sys/dev/randomdev/randomdev.c 1.11 +20 -1 src/sys/dev/randomdev/yarrow.c To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe cvs-all" in the body of the message