Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 19:56:40 +0000 (UTC) From: Bernard Spil <brnrd@FreeBSD.org> To: ports-committers@freebsd.org, svn-ports-all@freebsd.org, svn-ports-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r494996 - in head/security/openssl111: . files Message-ID: <201903071956.x27Jue3i034094@repo.freebsd.org>
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Author: brnrd Date: Thu Mar 7 19:56:40 2019 New Revision: 494996 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/ports/494996 Log: security/openssl111: Security update for CVE-2019-1543 MFH: 2019Q1 Security: e56f2f7c-410e-11e9-b95c-b499baebfeaf Added: head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2019-1543 (contents, props changed) Modified: head/security/openssl111/Makefile Modified: head/security/openssl111/Makefile ============================================================================== --- head/security/openssl111/Makefile Thu Mar 7 19:51:21 2019 (r494995) +++ head/security/openssl111/Makefile Thu Mar 7 19:56:40 2019 (r494996) @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ PORTNAME= openssl PORTVERSION= 1.1.1b +PORTREVISION= 1 CATEGORIES= security devel MASTER_SITES= https://www.openssl.org/source/ \ ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/ @@ -29,7 +30,6 @@ USE_PERL5= build TEST_TARGET= test LDFLAGS_i386= -Wl,-znotext -#LDFLAGS= ${LDFLAGS_${ARCH}} MAKE_ARGS+= WHOLE_ARCHIVE_FLAG=--whole-archive CNF_LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS}" MAKE_ENV+= LIBRPATH="${PREFIX}/lib" GREP_OPTIONS= Added: head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2019-1543 ============================================================================== --- /dev/null 00:00:00 1970 (empty, because file is newly added) +++ head/security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2019-1543 Thu Mar 7 19:56:40 2019 (r494996) @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for +every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) +should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and +front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it +also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case +only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are +ignored. + +It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. +Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious +confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the +default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to +the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique +nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a +reused nonce. + +Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the +integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the +integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further +affected. + +Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe +because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user +applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce +length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. + +CVE-2019-1543 + +Fixes #8345 + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406) + +(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6) +--- + crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c +index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644 +--- crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.orig ++++ crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c +@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct { + + #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data) + ++#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12 ++ + static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], + const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc) +@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: +- if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) ++ if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN) + return 0; + actx->nonce_len = arg; + return 1;
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