From owner-cvs-lib Mon Mar 24 09:10:56 1997 Return-Path: Received: (from root@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id JAA18717 for cvs-lib-outgoing; Mon, 24 Mar 1997 09:10:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from rover.village.org (rover.village.org [204.144.255.49]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) with SMTP id JAA18479; Mon, 24 Mar 1997 09:07:49 -0800 (PST) Received: from rover.village.org [127.0.0.1] by rover.village.org with esmtp (Exim 0.56 #1) id E0w9DDd-0005Ii-00; Mon, 24 Mar 1997 10:07:37 -0700 To: =?KOI8-R?B?4c7E0sXKIP7F0s7P1w==?= Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/lib/libc/stdtime localtime.c Cc: CVS-committers@freefall.freebsd.org, cvs-all@freefall.freebsd.org, cvs-lib@freefall.freebsd.org In-reply-to: Your message of "Mon, 24 Mar 1997 19:20:42 +0300." References: Date: Mon, 24 Mar 1997 10:07:36 -0700 From: Warner Losh Message-Id: Sender: owner-cvs-lib@FreeBSD.ORG X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk In message =?KOI8-R?B?4c7E0sXKIP7F0s7P1w==?= writes: : privs initially on : privs off (by program) : (your check shows nothing and allow some flexibility) : intruder write some nasty code to the stack : privs on (by program) : He got priveledges! Yes. I understand this. This particular change however is just for what files are opened, rather than to guard against buffer overflows. I also understand that other of my patches are vulnerable to this too, but at least some of the holes are closed, and the code is well marked for when I see issetugid() goes into the kernel. There is no false sense of security, because I know the problem isn't completely solved :-). Warner