Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 20:13:41 +0200 From: Harald Schmalzbauer <h.schmalzbauer@omnilan.de> To: FreeBSD CURRENT <freebsd-current@freebsd.org> Subject: HW fed /dev/random Message-ID: <522F6155.40101@omnilan.de>
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This is an OpenPGP/MIME signed message (RFC 2440 and 3156) --------------enig78FC4776DEF45BD76F0A3930 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hello, some time ago, before random(4) was rewritten for FreeBSD 5 by Mark Murray, we had rng, the i815 hardware random number generator. At this time, there were rumors about the quality of the randomness. Now we have rdrand (BullMountain hardware random generator in IvyBridge) and Dual_EC_DRBG (NSA's NIST contribution) makes me wonder if quality is again something to worry about - although kib's commit message states: =E2=80=9EFrom the Intel whitepapers and articles about Bull Mountain, it = seems that we do not need to perform post-processing of RDRAND results, like AES-encryption of the data with random IV and keys, which was done for Padlock. Intel claims that sanitization is performed in hardware.=E2=80=9C= When we use the software random device, one has great control over /dev/random with sysctk kern.random. Are there considerations to extend the HW-rng-implementation by optional post processing? -Harry --------------enig78FC4776DEF45BD76F0A3930 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: OpenPGP digital signature Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.18 (FreeBSD) iEYEARECAAYFAlIvYVUACgkQLDqVQ9VXb8iEPQCgn1d/XUCFYTsVv2zwcxrlmreJ cYAAn3wvGDEMiqt4jG4Sphv4JjN3bchz =FpO0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --------------enig78FC4776DEF45BD76F0A3930--
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