From owner-freebsd-security Sun Mar 14 2: 8:17 1999 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from alcanet.com.au (border.alcanet.com.au [203.62.196.10]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E6F61503E for ; Sun, 14 Mar 1999 02:07:57 -0800 (PST) (envelope-from peter.jeremy@auss2.alcatel.com.au) Received: by border.alcanet.com.au id <40346>; Sun, 14 Mar 1999 19:55:21 +1000 Date: Sun, 14 Mar 1999 20:07:28 +1000 From: Peter Jeremy Subject: Re: ACL's To: robert+freebsd@cyrus.watson.org Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Message-Id: <99Mar14.195521est.40346@border.alcanet.com.au> Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Robert Watson wrote: >BTW, I'd really like to get rid of hard links -- they allow users to >retain copies of setuid files after the owner thinks they are deleted. This strikes me as overkill. Why not just change either rm(1) or unlink(2) to remove set[gu]id bits on executables? This would have the same net effect and the behaviour can probably be justified. >I.e., user creates a hard link to /usr/sbin/somesetuidbin to >/usr/tmp/mytemp. Normal users shouldn't have write permission anywhere on a partition containing system binaries - this also removes the problem. (Note that /usr/tmp is accessible only by root under FreeBSD). Peter To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message