From owner-freebsd-security Fri Nov 1 17:12:10 1996 Return-Path: owner-security Received: (from root@localhost) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.7.5/8.7.3) id RAA20358 for security-outgoing; Fri, 1 Nov 1996 17:12:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from www.trifecta.com (www.trifecta.com [206.245.150.3]) by freefall.freebsd.org (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id RAA20344 for ; Fri, 1 Nov 1996 17:12:05 -0800 (PST) Received: (from dev@localhost) by www.trifecta.com (8.7.5/8.6.12) id UAA08143; Fri, 1 Nov 1996 20:04:43 -0500 (EST) Date: Fri, 1 Nov 1996 20:04:43 -0500 (EST) From: Dev Chanchani To: Marc Slemko cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.org Subject: Re: chroot() security In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-security@FreeBSD.org X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk On Fri, 1 Nov 1996, Marc Slemko wrote: > Never loose sight of the fact that if someone gets root in the chrooted > environment, they have root on the whole machine. The chrooted > environment does not lessen the implications of getting root, it only > makes it harder to do so. Marc, Thanks for the reply. Basically, how can someone get out of a chroot()'ed environment is they get root? Can they access the filesystem outsite their chroot()'ed directory? I know they can place their own binaries and begin to sniff, etc, but can they easily get out of their environment? Also, can a user access the inode table or does the kernel only access the inode table? Thanks..