From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Sep 22 12:17:16 2005 Return-Path: X-Original-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6E33816A41F for ; Thu, 22 Sep 2005 12:17:16 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from simon@eddie.nitro.dk) Received: from nfishbone.nitro.dk (cpe.atm2-0-71337.0x535ccf26.taanxx2.customer.tele.dk [83.92.207.38]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4E97343D55 for ; Thu, 22 Sep 2005 12:17:14 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from simon@eddie.nitro.dk) Received: from eddie.nitro.dk (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by nfishbone.nitro.dk (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D6AC61C2C for ; Thu, 22 Sep 2005 14:17:10 +0200 (CEST) Received: by eddie.nitro.dk (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 62C4D11A320; Thu, 22 Sep 2005 14:13:27 +0200 (CEST) Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2005 14:13:27 +0200 From: "Simon L. Nielsen" To: Borja Marcos Message-ID: <20050922121326.GA66046@eddie.nitro.dk> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="2fHTh5uZTiUOsy+g" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.11 Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Mounting filesystems with "noexec" X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2005 12:17:16 -0000 --2fHTh5uZTiUOsy+g Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On 2005.09.22 13:11:43 +0200, Borja Marcos wrote: > I've been playing a bit with the "noexec" flag for filesystems. It > can represent a substantial obstacle against the exploitation of > security holes. Please note the following from the mount(8) manual page: noexec Do not allow execution of any binaries on the mounted file system. This option is useful for a server that has file systems containing binaries for architectures other than its own. Note: This option was not designed as a security feature and no guarantee is made that it will prevent malicious code execution; for example, it is still possible to execute scripts which reside on a noexec mounted partition. I don't know if it makes sense to log noexec failures, but at least it's important that people don't completely rely on noexec for security. --=20 Simon L. Nielsen --2fHTh5uZTiUOsy+g Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (FreeBSD) iD8DBQFDMp/mh9pcDSc1mlERAnLOAJ0WqGjhfVfyTTwW4bdBrCWSxI7/3ACggZVD YBe2yVRDSJQcW0PPckKsSdc= =wk35 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --2fHTh5uZTiUOsy+g--