From owner-cvs-src@FreeBSD.ORG Tue May 17 14:50:13 2005 Return-Path: Delivered-To: cvs-src@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5ECE16A4CE; Tue, 17 May 2005 14:50:13 +0000 (GMT) Received: from smtp-1.dlr.de (smtp-1.dlr.de [195.37.61.185]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9BBAA43D2D; Tue, 17 May 2005 14:50:12 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from Hartmut.Brandt@dlr.de) Received: from beagle.kn.op.dlr.de ([129.247.173.6]) by smtp-1.dlr.de over TLS secured channel with Microsoft SMTPSVC(6.0.3790.211); Tue, 17 May 2005 16:50:01 +0200 Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 16:50:07 +0200 (CEST) From: Harti Brandt X-X-Sender: brandt_h@beagle.kn.op.dlr.de To: Alexander Leidinger In-Reply-To: <20050517144446.gibxprydoosokw0k@netchild.homeip.net> Message-ID: <20050517164720.O7468@beagle.kn.op.dlr.de> References: <200505121545.j4CFjENu078768@repoman.freebsd.org> <20050517144446.gibxprydoosokw0k@netchild.homeip.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII X-OriginalArrivalTime: 17 May 2005 14:50:01.0259 (UTC) FILETIME=[B3F1F7B0:01C55AEF] cc: cvs-src@FreeBSD.org cc: Max Okumoto Subject: Re: cvs commit: src/usr.bin/make job.c##SPAM X-BeenThere: cvs-src@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list Reply-To: Harti Brandt List-Id: CVS commit messages for the src tree List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 14:50:14 -0000 On Tue, 17 May 2005, Alexander Leidinger wrote: AL>Max Okumoto wrote: AL> AL>> If I use mkdtemp(), there is a chance that someone with the AL>> same UID could race to build the fifo. Do we care about AL>> races with ourselves? Or am I just being toooo paranoid? :-) AL> AL>Are you sure? mkdtemp() generates a "random" name like mkstemp() does, so the AL>race would have existed already before (but the probability is very low that AL>two make instances generate the same name)... Yes, I think the race existed before. That's why I put the somewhat fuzzy security statement into the commit log. I put it so fuzzy, because I'm not sure we should worry about this. The only thing that could happen is a kind of DoS attack from a program running under your UID (it could steal you tokens or insert an unlimited number of tokens) on your make run. This seems actually not a something to worry about. harti