Date: Mon, 14 Dec 1998 18:43:56 -0800 (PST) From: Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com> To: Dag-Erling Smorgrav <des@flood.ping.uio.no> Cc: committers@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Bind sandbox bogosity Message-ID: <199812150243.SAA50480@apollo.backplane.com> References: <xzpvhjembb6.fsf@flood.ping.uio.no>
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The first problem is a non-problem, i.e. a bogus
warning because HUPing named does not change it's
pid.
The second problem is real, and I did mention it. However,
my feeling is that running named in a sandbox is a basic
security precaution that must be taken and that the vast
majority of configurations will not have a problem with
it. It would be nice if there were a way to turn off
the interface scanning junk, though. named is the only
major program I know that does that (a Vixie bogosity,
in my view).
-Matt
Matthew Dillon Engineering, HiWay Technologies, Inc. & BEST Internet
Communications & God knows what else.
<dillon@backplane.com> (Please include original email in any response)
:
:One side-effect of forcing named to run as bind:bind is that when you
:HUP it, it tries to recreate the pid file (update_pid_file(), which is
:called from load_configuration(), both in ns_config.c), but can't
:because it doesn't have privs any more and /var/run is only writeable
:by root. Another, far more serious, side-effect is that when it
:rescans interfaces (normally every 60 minutes) and finds an interface
:it wasn't already bound to, it'll try to bind to it, and fail
:miserably because only root can bind to port 53.
:
:Solution 1: don't run named as bind:bind (and consequently back out
: revision 1.64 of src/etc/rc.conf and revisions 1.33 and 1.32 of
: src/etc/mtree/BSD.root.dist)
:
:Solution 2: hack bind to temporarily regain privs when HUPed.
:
:DES
:--
:Dag-Erling Smorgrav - des@flood.ping.uio.no
:
:
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