From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Fri Jul 18 20:53:07 2014 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 491EC181 for ; Fri, 18 Jul 2014 20:53:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from manchester-1.man.uk.cluster.ok24.net (manchester-1.man.uk.cluster.ok24.net [213.138.100.64]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 052DB2E15 for ; Fri, 18 Jul 2014 20:53:06 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=simple/simple; d=pyro.eu.org; s=07.2014; h=Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:In-Reply-To:References:Subject:To:MIME-Version:From:Date:Message-ID; bh=hwpLYTN3cHciVVARnx0SwYOc6fR8utSmOOBFPwLg0J0=; b=N0M0BdhY2fvxrvJx1yUliLDtzVxYX2AgTbwX6taUsgMqJk4YVLL7CGKUZWLggUhub7ypClly74LetWiVB0trAkzS8nnXFJRuVHXs26WU11u9dWU87gG/47kXaBxMWSSXlXm9nX4bZhnnglOLitvXcM7Q1NXlaZ82+eanT15QXxc=; X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.1 required=2.0 tests=ALL_TRUSTED, BAYES_00, DKIM_ADSP_DISCARD Received: from guisborough-1.rcc.uk.cluster.ok24.net ([217.155.40.118]) by manchester-1.man.uk.cluster.ok24.net with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1X8F9L-0001Aa-56 for freebsd-security@freebsd.org; Fri, 18 Jul 2014 21:53:04 +0100 Received: from [10.0.1.191] by guisborough-1.rcc.uk.cluster.ok24.net with esmtpsa (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_128_CBC_SHA1:16) (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1X8F9K-0002jQ-Ea for freebsd-security@freebsd.org; Fri, 18 Jul 2014 21:53:02 +0100 Message-ID: <53C9892D.1050002@pyro.eu.org> Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 21:53:01 +0100 From: Steven Chamberlain User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Icedove/24.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: Speed and security of /dev/urandom References: <53C85F42.1000704@pyro.eu.org> <53C9857D.6000806@freebsd.org> In-Reply-To: <53C9857D.6000806@freebsd.org> X-Enigmail-Version: 1.6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=KOI8-R Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.18 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 20:53:07 -0000 On 18/07/14 21:37, Andrey Chernov wrote: > One of the reason I hear is that true random entropy bits can be quickly > exhausted if every userland program will drain them so much. True of Linux at least, I assume that's why they must make /dev/random block when the estimated entropy in the pool is low. Applications have been encouraged to not excessively read even from /dev/urandom, for the same reason, so it makes sense on Linux to stretch with RC4 or something. Regards, -- Steven Chamberlain steven@pyro.eu.org