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Date:      Tue, 29 Oct 2002 12:41:36 -0800
From:      Terry Lambert <tlambert2@mindspring.com>
To:        Cliff Sarginson <cls@raggedclown.net>
Cc:        freebsd-chat@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: SMTPD-32
Message-ID:  <3DBEF280.54F2C5B4@mindspring.com>
References:  <20021029162201.GA1296@raggedclown.net>

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Cliff Sarginson wrote:
> Does anyone know why the relaying of mail through an SMTPD-32 server
> scores high points on my spamassasin checker. What is it ? A piece of
> email to freebsd Qs got in my spam folder partly because of it - non
> Spam I should emphaise.
> Google tells me it is some piece of software sold by BMT Micro ..
> whoever they are.

SMTPD_IN_RCVD

...Basically, your message's "Received:" timestamp line had the
atom "smtpd" in it (e.g in place of something like "sendmail",
etc.).

The answer to this is that this is given a high rating in the
rules (you can change your local copy to give it a lower rating
if you want).  The reason for this high rating is that the pair
of programs "smtpd" and "smtpfwdd", which are designed to receive
mail into a chroot environment to prevent buffer overflow attacks
from working (see Obtuse System's documentation on the code for
more details) have historically been very, very easy to trick into
forwarding SPAM.

It's possible to lock them down, in more recent versions, and with
the correct blocking rules, but most people don't know about how
to write correct blocking rules.

Old InterJet's used to use Obtuse system's smtpd/smtpfwdd software,
so I am very familiar with this problem.

Another alternative is to modify the string that SMTP-32 records
in the "Received:" timestamp line, to, say, "SMTP-32", instead of
"smtpd".  Of course, a lot of fools believe in "security through
obscurity", and would therefore argue that this would reveal some
information which can be used for software-targetted attacks --
as if the people who do this sort of thing wouldn't use all the
possible attacks, rather than just targetted ones.

So... uless you can get the sender to hack their binary (zapping
the "d" in the format string with a binary editor would be enough),
then your only choices are to live with it, or to modify the weight
for that particular attribute of a message.

-- Terry

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