From owner-svn-src-head@freebsd.org Mon May 7 17:16:20 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-head@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 554FEFB7384; Mon, 7 May 2018 17:16:20 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jhb@freebsd.org) Received: from smtp.freebsd.org (smtp.freebsd.org [96.47.72.83]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "smtp.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE6FF786BE; Mon, 7 May 2018 17:16:19 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jhb@freebsd.org) Received: from ralph.baldwin.cx (ralph.baldwin.cx [66.234.199.215]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) (Authenticated sender: jhb) by smtp.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8B69F194C6; Mon, 7 May 2018 17:16:18 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from jhb@freebsd.org) From: John Baldwin To: Andriy Gapon Cc: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: Re: svn commit: r332730 - in head/sys: amd64/amd64 i386/i386 powerpc/powerpc Date: Fri, 04 May 2018 15:55:18 -0700 Message-ID: <4861734.o1QKEXXL6r@ralph.baldwin.cx> User-Agent: KMail/4.14.10 (FreeBSD/11.1-STABLE; KDE/4.14.30; amd64; ; ) In-Reply-To: <201804181544.w3IFisf7045389@repo.freebsd.org> References: <201804181544.w3IFisf7045389@repo.freebsd.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-BeenThere: svn-src-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.25 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the src tree for head/-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 07 May 2018 17:16:20 -0000 On Wednesday, April 18, 2018 03:44:54 PM Andriy Gapon wrote: > Author: avg > Date: Wed Apr 18 15:44:54 2018 > New Revision: 332730 > URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/332730 > > Log: > don't check for kdb reentry in trap_fatal(), it's impossible > > trap() checks for it earlier and calls kdb_reentry(). I just noticed today that there are several other kdb_trap() checks in other architectures that need this fix and the KDB_WHY_TRAP change. Just grep for debugger_on_panic under sys. For example: arm/arm/trap-v4.c: if (debugger_on_panic || kdb_active) arm/arm/trap-v6.c: if (debugger_on_panic || kdb_active) arm64/arm64/trap.c: if (debugger_on_panic || kdb_active) mips/mips/trap.c: if (debugger_on_panic || kdb_active) { -- John Baldwin