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Date:      Tue, 1 Oct 1996 11:05:03 PDT
From:      Bill Fenner <fenner@parc.xerox.com>
To:        Marc Slemko <marcs@znep.com>
Cc:        freebsd-security@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: setuid programs in freebsd 
Message-ID:  <96Oct1.110511pdt.177476@crevenia.parc.xerox.com>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sun, 29 Sep 1996 20:55:48 PDT." <Pine.BSF.3.95.960929214259.16956L-100000@alive.ampr.ab.ca> 

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Marc,

  There are certain programs that have been modified to do the minimum 
required tasks before releasing their setuid-ness, e.g. ping and traceroute 
basically do

main()
{
	s = socket();
	setuid(getuid());

I've been meaning to do the same to mrinfo & mtrace for quite a long time.  
Perhaps these could be specially labelled in your document?

>   119   32 -r-sr-xr-x    1 root     bin         16384 Jul 16 20:34 ./usr/sbin
>  /traceroute
>
>COMMENTS: There have been some recent security fixes in traceroute, but
>I am uncertain as to if they fix exploitable holes.  *** 

Yes, the holes are exploitable if you control the DNS of a host that you can 
traceroute through.

>COMMENTS: ping is a very useful thing for users, although there are possible
>denial of service attacks possible, especially with the '-l' option.  There
>have been some potential security holes fixed after 2.1.5 was released,
>but it appears like none of them are exploitable.  Perhaps.

I agree, the setuid(getuid()) in ping was basically belt-and-suspenders kind 
of fix.

  Bill




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