From owner-freebsd-security Mon May 14 11: 2:45 2001 Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mail.wlcg.com (mail.wlcg.com [207.226.17.4]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 08D3D37B42C for ; Mon, 14 May 2001 11:02:43 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from rsimmons@wlcg.com) Received: from localhost (rsimmons@localhost) by mail.wlcg.com (8.11.3/8.11.3) with ESMTP id f4EI2Ii52070; Mon, 14 May 2001 14:02:18 -0400 (EDT) (envelope-from rsimmons@wlcg.com) Date: Mon, 14 May 2001 14:02:15 -0400 (EDT) From: Rob Simmons To: Eric Anderson Cc: "Oulman, Jamie" , freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: nfs mounts / su / yp In-Reply-To: <3B0015E5.2E1AED1B@centtech.com> Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Precedence: bulk X-Loop: FreeBSD.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 You could set the console to insecure in /etc/ttys. That way single user mode will ask for the root password. You still can't prevent someone from booting with their own floppy disk and making changes that way. I think the only way to prevent that is to use an encrypted filesystem of some sort. Robert Simmons Systems Administrator http://www.wlcg.com/ On Mon, 14 May 2001, Eric Anderson wrote: > If a user reboots their machine, goes into single user mode, and changes > the local root password (and adds their username into the wheel group of > course), then boots into multiuser mode, they can su to root, then su to > any NIS user they desire, and do malicious things as that user. su'ing > from root to any other user never asks for a password, so login.conf > isn't used (right?).. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.5 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQE7AB2qv8Bofna59hYRA0ebAKCQ9R1wLoemlWAuEdplqcSMcY12IQCfVH0B 8SkJHNs8J3aEYZ8dk27La2k= =Qb9E -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message