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From: "Poul-Henning Kamp" <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 03 Mar 2005 11:37:31 EST."
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Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 17:49:38 +0100
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Subject: Re: FUD about CGD and GBDE 
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In message <20050303163731.GA8001@panix.com>, Thor Lancelot Simon writes:

>I could not disagree more.  When it comes to nonstandard homebrewed
>cryptosystems foisted off on unsuspecting users with a bundle of
>claims of algorithm strength that they're not competent to evaluate
>for themselves, we do not need more ideas, nor more people trying
>out ideas; we need less.
>
>Standard, widely analyzed cryptographic algorithms are good.

s/ are good/, when applied with caution and wisdom, are good/

:-)

-- 
Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk@FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.