Date: Fri, 28 Jan 2000 02:01:36 -0700 (MST) From: FreeBSD Security Officer <security-officer@freebsd.org> Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory: FreeBSD-SA-00:02.procfs Message-ID: <200001280901.CAA60307@harmony.village.org>
next in thread | raw e-mail | index | archive | help
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-00:01 Security Advisory
FreeBSD, Inc.
Topic: Old procfs hole incompletely filled
Category: core
Module: make
Announced: 2000-01-24
Affects: All versions before the correction date.
Corrected: 2000-01-20
FreeBSD only: NO
Patches: ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-00:02/procfs.patch
I. Background
procfs provides access to other processes memory spaces. This is
intended to be used in debugging and has many safeguards built into it
to prevent abuse.
II. Problem Description
In January 1997 a fatal flaw in *BSD procfs code (leading to a local
root compromise) was discussed on various security forums. The exploit
code dealt with /proc/pid/mem interface. Since then *BSD kernels
contained a simple fix which was meant to close this hole.
Unfortunately, throughout these three years it was still possible to
abuse /proc/pid/mem in a similar, though more complicated fashion,
which could lead to local root compromise.
III. Impact
Local users can gain root access.
IV. Workaround
You can unmount /proc. In both 3.x-stable and 4.0-current this will
break truss and gcore. In 3.x-stable systems only it will reduce the
amount of information ps reports.
V. Solution
Apply the following patch
Index: sys/filedesc.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /base/FreeBSD-CVS/src/sys/sys/filedesc.h,v
retrieving revision 1.15.2.1
diff -u -r1.15.2.1 filedesc.h
--- filedesc.h 1999/08/29 16:32:22 1.15.2.1
+++ filedesc.h 2000/01/20 21:39:29
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@
int fsetown __P((pid_t, struct sigio **));
void funsetown __P((struct sigio *));
void funsetownlst __P((struct sigiolst *));
+void setugidsafety __P((struct proc *p));
#endif
#endif
Index: kern/kern_descrip.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /base/FreeBSD-CVS/src/sys/kern/kern_descrip.c,v
retrieving revision 1.58.2.3
diff -u -r1.58.2.3 kern_descrip.c
--- kern_descrip.c 1999/11/18 08:09:08 1.58.2.3
+++ kern_descrip.c 2000/01/20 21:40:00
@@ -984,6 +984,62 @@
}
/*
+ * For setuid/setgid programs we don't want to people to use that setuidness
+ * to generate error messages which write to a file which otherwise would
+ * otherwise be off limits to the proces.
+ *
+ * This is a gross hack to plug the hole. A better solution would involve
+ * a special vop or other form of generalized access control mechanism. We
+ * go ahead and just reject all procfs file systems accesses as dangerous.
+ *
+ * Since setugidsafety calls this only for fd 0, 1 and 2, this check is
+ * sufficient. We also don't for setugidness since we know we are.
+ */
+static int
+is_unsafe(struct file *fp)
+{
+ if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_VNODE &&
+ ((struct vnode *)(fp->f_data))->v_tag == VT_PROCFS)
+ return (1);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make this setguid thing safe, if at all possible.
+ */
+void
+setugidsafety(p)
+ struct proc *p;
+{
+ struct filedesc *fdp = p->p_fd;
+ struct file **fpp;
+ char *fdfp;
+ register int i;
+
+ /* Certain daemons might not have file descriptors. */
+ if (fdp == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ fpp = fdp->fd_ofiles;
+ fdfp = fdp->fd_ofileflags;
+ for (i = 0; i <= fdp->fd_lastfile; i++, fpp++, fdfp++) {
+ if (i > 2)
+ break;
+ if (*fpp != NULL && is_unsafe(*fpp)) {
+ if (*fdfp & UF_MAPPED)
+ (void) munmapfd(p, i);
+ (void) closef(*fpp, p);
+ *fpp = NULL;
+ *fdfp = 0;
+ if (i < fdp->fd_freefile)
+ fdp->fd_freefile = i;
+ }
+ }
+ while (fdp->fd_lastfile > 0 && fdp->fd_ofiles[fdp->fd_lastfile] == NULL)
+ fdp->fd_lastfile--;
+}
+
+/*
* Close any files on exec?
*/
void
Index: kern/kern_exec.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /base/FreeBSD-CVS/src/sys/kern/kern_exec.c,v
retrieving revision 1.93.2.3
diff -u -r1.93.2.3 kern_exec.c
--- kern_exec.c 1999/08/29 16:25:58 1.93.2.3
+++ kern_exec.c 2000/01/20 21:39:29
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@
if (attr.va_mode & VSGID)
p->p_ucred->cr_gid = attr.va_gid;
setsugid(p);
+ setugidsafety(p);
} else {
if (p->p_ucred->cr_uid == p->p_cred->p_ruid &&
p->p_ucred->cr_gid == p->p_cred->p_rgid)
VI. Credits
We are republishing a heavily edited FEAR security advisory (number 1)
entitled "*BSD procfs vulnerability". More information about FEAR can
be found at http://www.fear.pl. We would like to thank
nergal@idea.avet.com.pl for sending a preliminary version of the
advisory to us in time to correct the problem.
=============================================================================
FreeBSD, Inc.
Web Site: http://www.freebsd.org/
Confidential contacts: security-officer@freebsd.org
Security notifications: security-notifications@freebsd.org
Security public discussion: freebsd-security@freebsd.org
PGP Key: ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/public_key.asc
Notice: Any patches in this document may not apply cleanly due to
modifications caused by digital signature or mailer software.
Please reference the URL listed at the top of this document
for original copies of all patches if necessary.
=============================================================================
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.3ia
Charset: noconv
Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface
iQCVAwUBOJFWeFUuHi5z0oilAQHo2AP+N4GDREEmjxy6RUvt+G3cRe1Sx4yxr/Jd
q70D5Icp3JlcJgxGfWFqGGvt8yx9xMm6d57mFDltdvPKr0TY0n0bY39BJlRAto9n
gn8BJJvQ0WQ15ctOQKIsGwGJqHvA+p4qAHYFE3sUIZn6oMz5//C5OmaC7mFtrycY
TI64bNR+0F8=
=/F89
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org
with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
Want to link to this message? Use this URL: <https://mail-archive.FreeBSD.org/cgi/mid.cgi?200001280901.CAA60307>