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Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2000 23:12:05 -0800
From: "Crist J. Clark" <cjclark@reflexnet.net>
To: Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.ORG>
Cc: Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net>,
	Mark Zielinski <markz@2cactus.com>, cjclark@alum.mit.edu,
	freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject: Re: Read-Only Filesystems
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On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 05:59:31PM -0800, Kris Kennaway wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 05:41:29PM -0800, Alfred Perlstein wrote:

[snip]

> > Actually, securelevel as a all-covering blanket would work better
> > if people implemented fixes for it like a solution for the mount
> > problem described here.
> 
> That still doesn't alter the fact that only a single reboot is needed
> to undo the restrictions.

Could you elaborate on what scenario you are describing? Of course if
the attacker has physical access, he is a reboot away from getting by
securelevel. But is there a remote attack involving a reboot which
negates securelevel besides the obvious case where the rc* files (and
init, and kernel, and... ) are not sufficiently protected?
-- 
Crist J. Clark                           cjclark@alum.mit.edu


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