From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Fri Sep 19 05:28:59 2003 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8174D16A4B3 for ; Fri, 19 Sep 2003 05:28:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from storm.FreeBSD.org.uk (storm.FreeBSD.org.uk [194.242.157.42]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48D7543FE1 for ; Fri, 19 Sep 2003 05:28:58 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from mark@grondar.org) Received: from storm.FreeBSD.org.uk (Ugrondar@localhost [127.0.0.1]) by storm.FreeBSD.org.uk (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h8JCSpt1035760; Fri, 19 Sep 2003 13:28:51 +0100 (BST) (envelope-from mark@grondar.org) Received: (from Ugrondar@localhost)h8JCSpLL035759; Fri, 19 Sep 2003 13:28:51 +0100 (BST) (envelope-from mark@grondar.org) X-Authentication-Warning: storm.FreeBSD.org.uk: Ugrondar set sender to mark@grondar.org using -f Received: from grondar.org (localhost [127.0.0.1])h8J875fq006577; Fri, 19 Sep 2003 09:07:05 +0100 (BST) (envelope-from mark@grondar.org) Message-Id: <200309190807.h8J875fq006577@grimreaper.grondar.org> To: "David G. Andersen" From: Mark Murray In-Reply-To: Your message of "Thu, 18 Sep 2003 19:36:36 MDT." <20030918193636.A94860@cs.utah.edu> Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2003 09:07:05 +0100 Sender: mark@grondar.org X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-2.3 required=5.0 tests=EMAIL_ATTRIBUTION,FWD_MSG,IN_REP_TO,QUOTED_EMAIL_TEXT, REPLY_WITH_QUOTES version=2.55 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.55 (1.174.2.19-2003-05-19-exp) cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Subject: Re: [Fwd: Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-03:12.openssh] X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Security issues [members-only posting] List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Sep 2003 12:28:59 -0000 "David G. Andersen" writes: > You're mistaken. /dev/random stops feeding you random bits > when it doesn't have enough. /dev/urandom depletes the entropy > pool, but when it starts to run out, it falls back to hashing > to generate pseudo-random sequences from the random bits that > it can obtain. Mostly correct :-). /dev/urandom (in FreeBSD-4-*) always hashes the pool. It doesn't care whether or not entropy has been harvested first, unlike /dev/random which requires a positive entropy count before suppying output. (This provides a doozy of a DoS, BTW, where "cat /dev/urandom > /dev/null" renders /dev/random useless). M -- Mark Murray iumop ap!sdn w,I idlaH