From owner-freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Thu Mar 3 17:31:10 2005 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.FreeBSD.org (mx1.freebsd.org [216.136.204.125]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B10F016A4CE for ; Thu, 3 Mar 2005 17:31:10 +0000 (GMT) Received: from saturn.criticalmagic.com (saturn.criticalmagic.com [64.74.124.105]) by mx1.FreeBSD.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58BEB43D31 for ; Thu, 3 Mar 2005 17:31:10 +0000 (GMT) (envelope-from rcoleman@criticalmagic.com) Received: from [10.40.30.110] (delta.ciphertrust.com [216.235.158.34]) by saturn.criticalmagic.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9CE393BD10; Thu, 3 Mar 2005 12:31:09 -0500 (EST) Message-ID: <42274A0C.5010403@criticalmagic.com> Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 12:31:56 -0500 From: Richard Coleman Organization: Critical Magic User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0 (X11/20041230) X-Accept-Language: en-us, en MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Poul-Henning Kamp References: <8837.1109868465@critter.freebsd.dk> In-Reply-To: <8837.1109868465@critter.freebsd.dk> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit cc: tech-security@NetBSD.org cc: elric@imrryr.org cc: hackers@freebsd.org cc: tls@rek.tjls.com cc: crypto@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: FUD about CGD and GBDE X-BeenThere: freebsd-hackers@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: Technical Discussions relating to FreeBSD List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 03 Mar 2005 17:31:10 -0000 Poul-Henning Kamp wrote: > I fully agree with you about the philosophical points, but not on > the implications. > > I can not convince myself that encrypting a 40 GB disk sector by > sector using the same key, even if it is 256 bits, is a safe design. > > You seem to belive otherwise. > > And that's where it ends. > > Have a good life. I don't want to get in the middle of the GBDE/CGD debate, but my understanding is that the amount of material you can encrypt with a single key is dependent on the block size and (possibily the) cipher mode, not the key size. For instance, the NIST specification for AES and CCM mode (NIST Special Publication 800-38C) specifically states that you must limit the number of invocations of the block cipher (specifically AES) to 2^61. Now, I realize that is an upper bound. But even after removing several orders of magnitude, that leaves a huge amount of material you can encrypt with a single key. Just throwing out a data point. Richard Coleman rcoleman@criticalmagic.com