Date: Mon, 21 May 2018 03:51:33 +0000 From: bugzilla-noreply@freebsd.org To: arch@FreeBSD.org Subject: [Bug 121073] [kernel] [patch] run chroot as an unprivileged user Message-ID: <bug-121073-24229-m2ozV0rnN2@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/> In-Reply-To: <bug-121073-24229@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/> References: <bug-121073-24229@https.bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/>
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https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D121073 Julian Elischer <julian@FreeBSD.org> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CC| |julian@FreeBSD.org --- Comment #12 from Julian Elischer <julian@FreeBSD.org> --- If the ability to do this operation (unpriv chroot) is inherited, and the ability to set that bit is only settable by root then a process can only do this if a root ancestor has said that security is being lowered by this fam= ily of processes. I would even go as far as saying secure level would disable it along with a "no return" policy. (by which I mean once it is set in a proce= ss and then used you cannot get that ability back ... full stop.) This would allow the use of the functionality for "build machine" type situations where in reality it is root or trusted proxy doing the chroot. In addition it should be a one-shot.. you use it , you lose it. With the advent of "everyone has there own computer" I am not sure how important it is to have "real users" be able to do builds. --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.=
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