From owner-svn-src-all@freebsd.org Sun Jan 14 09:29:08 2018 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-all@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:1900:2254:206a::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 15C0EEB6480; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 09:29:08 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from kib@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E21C2741A6; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 09:29:07 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from kib@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3DC3B1FDC2; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 09:29:07 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from kib@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id w0E9T79Q056380; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 09:29:07 GMT (envelope-from kib@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from kib@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id w0E9T6nP056378; Sun, 14 Jan 2018 09:29:06 GMT (envelope-from kib@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201801140929.w0E9T6nP056378@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: kib set sender to kib@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Konstantin Belousov Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 09:29:06 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable@freebsd.org, svn-src-stable-11@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r327959 - in stable/11/sys: amd64/amd64 i386/i386 X-SVN-Group: stable-11 X-SVN-Commit-Author: kib X-SVN-Commit-Paths: in stable/11/sys: amd64/amd64 i386/i386 X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 327959 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: base MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: svn-src-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.25 Precedence: list List-Id: "SVN commit messages for the entire src tree \(except for " user" and " projects" \)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 09:29:08 -0000 Author: kib Date: Sun Jan 14 09:29:06 2018 New Revision: 327959 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/327959 Log: MFC r327816, r327834: Update comment explaining the check, to reality. Modified: stable/11/sys/amd64/amd64/support.S stable/11/sys/i386/i386/support.s Directory Properties: stable/11/ (props changed) Modified: stable/11/sys/amd64/amd64/support.S ============================================================================== --- stable/11/sys/amd64/amd64/support.S Sun Jan 14 06:03:40 2018 (r327958) +++ stable/11/sys/amd64/amd64/support.S Sun Jan 14 09:29:06 2018 (r327959) @@ -225,12 +225,11 @@ ENTRY(copyout) jz done_copyout /* - * Check explicitly for non-user addresses. If 486 write protection - * is being used, this check is essential because we are in kernel - * mode so the h/w does not provide any protection against writing - * kernel addresses. + * Check explicitly for non-user addresses. This check is essential + * because it prevents usermode from writing into the kernel. We do + * not verify anywhere else that the user did not specify a rogue + * address. */ - /* * First, prevent address wrapping. */ Modified: stable/11/sys/i386/i386/support.s ============================================================================== --- stable/11/sys/i386/i386/support.s Sun Jan 14 06:03:40 2018 (r327958) +++ stable/11/sys/i386/i386/support.s Sun Jan 14 09:29:06 2018 (r327959) @@ -284,12 +284,11 @@ ENTRY(copyout) jz done_copyout /* - * Check explicitly for non-user addresses. If 486 write protection - * is being used, this check is essential because we are in kernel - * mode so the h/w does not provide any protection against writing - * kernel addresses. + * Check explicitly for non-user addresses. This check is essential + * because it prevents usermode from writing into the kernel. We do + * not verify anywhere else that the user did not specify a rogue + * address. */ - /* * First, prevent address wrapping. */