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Date:      Thu, 21 Dec 2000 06:01:08 -0800
From:      Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.ORG>
To:        cjclark@alum.mit.edu
Cc:        Kris Kennaway <kris@FreeBSD.ORG>, Alfred Perlstein <bright@wintelcom.net>, Mark Zielinski <markz@2cactus.com>, freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Read-Only Filesystems
Message-ID:  <20001221060108.B26775@citusc.usc.edu>
In-Reply-To: <20001220231205.W96105@149.211.6.64.reflexcom.com>; from cjclark@reflexnet.net on Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 11:12:05PM -0800
References:  <20001219114936.A23819@rfx-64-6-211-149.users.reflexco> <20001219120953.S19572@fw.wintelcom.net> <20001219211642.D13474@citusc.usc.edu> <3A40BED3.1070909@2cactus.com> <20001220174056.C22288@citusc.usc.edu> <20001220174129.F19572@fw.wintelcom.net> <20001220175931.E22288@citusc.usc.edu> <20001220231205.W96105@149.211.6.64.reflexcom.com>

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\On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 11:12:05PM -0800, Crist J. Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 05:59:31PM -0800, Kris Kennaway wrote:
> > On Wed, Dec 20, 2000 at 05:41:29PM -0800, Alfred Perlstein wrote:
>=20
> [snip]
>=20
> > > Actually, securelevel as a all-covering blanket would work better
> > > if people implemented fixes for it like a solution for the mount
> > > problem described here.
> >=20
> > That still doesn't alter the fact that only a single reboot is needed
> > to undo the restrictions.
>=20
> Could you elaborate on what scenario you are describing? Of course if
> the attacker has physical access, he is a reboot away from getting by
> securelevel. But is there a remote attack involving a reboot which
> negates securelevel besides the obvious case where the rc* files (and
> init, and kernel, and... ) are not sufficiently protected?

Nope, that's the one. Once the attacker breaks root on a high
securelevel machine they can arrange it so that the next time the
system boots it does their dirty work for them prior to raising the
securelevel (e.g. load a KLD which allows them backdoor access around
the securelevel restrictions, so the system appears to be running
normally).

Kris

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