From owner-svn-src-head@freebsd.org Tue Feb 12 10:17:22 2019 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-head@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E4FC14E11A3; Tue, 12 Feb 2019 10:17:22 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tuexen@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:3]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B48F4850C5; Tue, 12 Feb 2019 10:17:21 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tuexen@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org (repo.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6068::e6a:0]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by mxrelay.nyi.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A820DE8DF; Tue, 12 Feb 2019 10:17:21 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from tuexen@FreeBSD.org) Received: from repo.freebsd.org ([127.0.1.37]) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id x1CAHLZE031794; Tue, 12 Feb 2019 10:17:21 GMT (envelope-from tuexen@FreeBSD.org) Received: (from tuexen@localhost) by repo.freebsd.org (8.15.2/8.15.2/Submit) id x1CAHLN0031793; Tue, 12 Feb 2019 10:17:21 GMT (envelope-from tuexen@FreeBSD.org) Message-Id: <201902121017.x1CAHLN0031793@repo.freebsd.org> X-Authentication-Warning: repo.freebsd.org: tuexen set sender to tuexen@FreeBSD.org using -f From: Michael Tuexen Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 10:17:21 +0000 (UTC) To: src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org Subject: svn commit: r344048 - head/sys/netinet X-SVN-Group: head X-SVN-Commit-Author: tuexen X-SVN-Commit-Paths: head/sys/netinet X-SVN-Commit-Revision: 344048 X-SVN-Commit-Repository: base MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: B48F4850C5 X-Spamd-Bar: -- Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-2.98 / 15.00]; local_wl_from(0.00)[FreeBSD.org]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-1.00)[-0.995,0]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.98)[-0.981,0]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-0.999,0]; ASN(0.00)[asn:11403, ipnet:2610:1c1:1::/48, country:US] X-BeenThere: svn-src-head@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: SVN commit messages for the src tree for head/-current List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 10:17:22 -0000 Author: tuexen Date: Tue Feb 12 10:17:21 2019 New Revision: 344048 URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/344048 Log: Improve input validation for raw IPv4 socket using the IP_HDRINCL option. This issue was found by running syzkaller on OpenBSD. Greg Steuck made me aware that the problem might also exist on FreeBSD. Reported by: Greg Steuck MFC after: 1 month Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18834 Modified: head/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c Modified: head/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c ============================================================================== --- head/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c Tue Feb 12 09:26:05 2019 (r344047) +++ head/sys/netinet/raw_ip.c Tue Feb 12 10:17:21 2019 (r344048) @@ -454,6 +454,8 @@ rip_output(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, ...) u_long dst; int flags = ((so->so_options & SO_DONTROUTE) ? IP_ROUTETOIF : 0) | IP_ALLOWBROADCAST; + int cnt; + u_char opttype, optlen, *cp; va_start(ap, so); dst = va_arg(ap, u_long); @@ -527,6 +529,34 @@ rip_output(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, ...) INP_RUNLOCK(inp); m_freem(m); return (EINVAL); + } + /* + * Don't allow IP options which do not have the required + * structure as specified in section 3.1 of RFC 791 on + * pages 15-23. + */ + cp = (u_char *)(ip + 1); + cnt = (ip->ip_hl << 2) - sizeof (struct ip); + for (; cnt > 0; cnt -= optlen, cp += optlen) { + opttype = cp[IPOPT_OPTVAL]; + if (opttype == IPOPT_EOL) + break; + if (opttype == IPOPT_NOP) { + optlen = 1; + continue; + } + if (cnt < IPOPT_OLEN + sizeof(u_char)) { + INP_RUNLOCK(inp); + m_freem(m); + return (EINVAL); + } + optlen = cp[IPOPT_OLEN]; + if (optlen < IPOPT_OLEN + sizeof(u_char) || + optlen > cnt) { + INP_RUNLOCK(inp); + m_freem(m); + return (EINVAL); + } } /* * This doesn't allow application to specify ID of zero,