From owner-svn-src-all@FreeBSD.ORG Tue Oct 20 18:09:16 2009 Return-Path: Delivered-To: svn-src-all@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2001:4f8:fff6::34]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7F6D31065670 for ; Tue, 20 Oct 2009 18:09:16 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from dougb@FreeBSD.org) Received: from mail2.fluidhosting.com (mx21.fluidhosting.com [204.14.89.4]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 338D18FC17 for ; Tue, 20 Oct 2009 18:09:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: (qmail 2464 invoked by uid 399); 20 Oct 2009 18:09:15 -0000 Received: from localhost (HELO foreign.dougb.net) (dougb@dougbarton.us@127.0.0.1) by localhost with ESMTPAM; 20 Oct 2009 18:09:15 -0000 X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1 X-Sender: dougb@dougbarton.us Message-ID: <4ADDFCCC.8070204@FreeBSD.org> Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 11:09:16 -0700 From: Doug Barton Organization: http://SupersetSolutions.com/ User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.23 (X11/20090822) MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Ruslan Ermilov References: <200910201636.n9KGapWo072133@svn.freebsd.org> In-Reply-To: <200910201636.n9KGapWo072133@svn.freebsd.org> X-Enigmail-Version: 0.96.0 OpenPGP: id=D5B2F0FB Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: svn-src-head@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, src-committers@freebsd.org Subject: Re: svn commit: r198295 - in head/sys: kern sys X-BeenThere: svn-src-all@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "SVN commit messages for the entire src tree \(except for " user" and " projects" \)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 18:09:16 -0000 Was this patch publicly reviewed anywhere? If so and I missed it I apologize. Otherwise it would be very nice if it got some discussion, review, etc. before it proceeds any further. Something as important as how we use random numbers, especially in the kernel, and especially as the system is initializing and entropy is low really needs a lot of review. This is not meant as an aspersion on Ruslan, Mr. Dounin, or anyone else involved. Doug Ruslan Ermilov wrote: > Author: ru > Date: Tue Oct 20 16:36:51 2009 > New Revision: 198295 > URL: http://svn.freebsd.org/changeset/base/198295 > > Log: > Random number generator initialization cleanup: > > - Introduce new SI_SUB_RANDOM point in boot sequence to make it > clear from where one may start using random(9). It should be as > early as possible, so place it just after SI_SUB_CPU where we > have some randomness on most platforms via get_cyclecount(). > > - Move stack protector initialization to be after SI_SUB_RANDOM > as before this point we have no randomness at all. This fixes > stack protector to actually protect stack with some random guard > value instead of a well-known one. > > Note that this patch doesn't try to address arc4random(9) issues. > With current code, it will be implicitly seeded by stack protector > and hence will get the same entropy as random(9). It will be > securely reseeded once /dev/random is feeded by some entropy from > userland. > > Submitted by: Maxim Dounin > MFC after: 3 days > > Modified: > head/sys/kern/init_main.c > head/sys/kern/stack_protector.c > head/sys/sys/kernel.h > > Modified: head/sys/kern/init_main.c > ============================================================================== > --- head/sys/kern/init_main.c Tue Oct 20 16:32:38 2009 (r198294) > +++ head/sys/kern/init_main.c Tue Oct 20 16:36:51 2009 (r198295) > @@ -570,6 +570,19 @@ proc0_post(void *dummy __unused) > } > SYSINIT(p0post, SI_SUB_INTRINSIC_POST, SI_ORDER_FIRST, proc0_post, NULL); > > +static void > +random_init(void *dummy __unused) > +{ > + > + /* > + * After CPU has been started we have some randomness on most > + * platforms via get_cyclecount(). For platforms that don't > + * we will reseed random(9) in proc0_post() as well. > + */ > + srandom(get_cyclecount()); > +} > +SYSINIT(random, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_FIRST, random_init, NULL); > + > /* > *************************************************************************** > **** > > Modified: head/sys/kern/stack_protector.c > ============================================================================== > --- head/sys/kern/stack_protector.c Tue Oct 20 16:32:38 2009 (r198294) > +++ head/sys/kern/stack_protector.c Tue Oct 20 16:36:51 2009 (r198295) > @@ -28,5 +28,4 @@ __stack_chk_init(void *dummy __unused) > for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(guard); i++) > __stack_chk_guard[i] = guard[i]; > } > -/* SI_SUB_EVENTHANDLER is right after SI_SUB_LOCK used by arc4rand() init. */ > -SYSINIT(stack_chk, SI_SUB_EVENTHANDLER, SI_ORDER_ANY, __stack_chk_init, NULL); > +SYSINIT(stack_chk, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_ANY, __stack_chk_init, NULL); > > Modified: head/sys/sys/kernel.h > ============================================================================== > --- head/sys/sys/kernel.h Tue Oct 20 16:32:38 2009 (r198294) > +++ head/sys/sys/kernel.h Tue Oct 20 16:36:51 2009 (r198295) > @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ enum sysinit_sub_id { > SI_SUB_VNET_PRELINK = 0x1E00000, /* vnet init before modules */ > SI_SUB_KLD = 0x2000000, /* KLD and module setup */ > SI_SUB_CPU = 0x2100000, /* CPU resource(s)*/ > + SI_SUB_RANDOM = 0x2120000, /* random number generator */ > SI_SUB_KDTRACE = 0x2140000, /* Kernel dtrace hooks */ > SI_SUB_MAC = 0x2180000, /* TrustedBSD MAC subsystem */ > SI_SUB_MAC_POLICY = 0x21C0000, /* TrustedBSD MAC policies */ > -- Improve the effectiveness of your Internet presence with a domain name makeover! http://SupersetSolutions.com/