From owner-freebsd-hackers Fri May 30 00:09:44 1997 Return-Path: Received: (from root@localhost) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) id AAA03250 for hackers-outgoing; Fri, 30 May 1997 00:09:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from panda.hilink.com.au (panda.hilink.com.au [203.8.15.25]) by hub.freebsd.org (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id AAA03241 for ; Fri, 30 May 1997 00:09:40 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from danny@localhost) by panda.hilink.com.au (8.8.5/8.8.5) id RAA13498; Fri, 30 May 1997 17:09:26 +1000 (EST) Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 17:09:24 +1000 (EST) From: "Daniel O'Callaghan" To: Bob Bishop cc: hackers@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Correct way to chroot for shell account users? In-Reply-To: Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Sender: owner-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG X-Loop: FreeBSD.org Precedence: bulk On Fri, 30 May 1997, Bob Bishop wrote: > At 0:03 +0100 30/5/97, Daniel O'Callaghan wrote: > >On Thu, 29 May 1997, Bob Bishop wrote: > > > >> I'm sure I'm being desperately naive here, but isn't it sufficient for > >> safety to make chroot(2) a successful no-op unless / is really / (ie the > >> process isn't chrooted already)? > > > >That means that you can't run anon ftp properly in a chrooted file system, > >because ftpd is not allowed to chroot again. > > Why would you want to do that? Well, I have virtual machines for my virtual WWW service - http, ftpd and telnetd all run chroot()ed. The customer can access everywhere in their virtual machine, and they have an anon ftp area which they can administer, but which gets chrooted again if someone logs in as anonymous. /* Daniel O'Callaghan */ /* HiLink Internet danny@hilink.com.au */ /* FreeBSD - works hard, plays hard... danny@freebsd.org */