Date: Wed, 03 Apr 1996 00:21:19 -0700 From: Warner Losh <imp@village.org> To: hackers@freebsd.org Subject: tftpd and -s Message-ID: <199604030721.AAA05371@rover.village.org>
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SunOS had a useful feature in tftpd -s. Since I replaced a Sun box as the boot server for my X terminal some time ago, I've been running a hacked version of tftpd that accepts only one arg: -s. -s dir will chroot to that dir before starting tftpd. I did this because it was easier to hack tftpd.c to accept -s than to try to reconfigure the X terminal that I moved to my freebsd box to put /usr/local/tftpboot/ in front of *ALL* of its paths. You have to run it as root, but it does a setuid to nobody once it the chroot is effective (well, immediately after it parses the args). And it fails safe: If chroot fails, so does tftpd on the theory that it is better to fail than to give access to any world readable file. Would anybody be interested in these patches to tftpd.c? While they wouldn't appeal to everybody, there may some interest. Warner
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