Date: Sat, 8 Sep 2001 18:54:15 -0700 From: Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org> To: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com> Cc: Kris Kennaway <kris@obsecurity.org>, "Andrey A. Chernov" <ache@nagual.pp.ru>, Matt Dillon <dillon@earth.backplane.com>, Jordan Hubbard <jkh@FreeBSD.ORG>, security@FreeBSD.ORG, audit@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: Fwd: Multiple vendor 'Taylor UUCP' problems. Message-ID: <20010908185415.A5619@xor.obsecurity.org> In-Reply-To: <200109090120.f891KvM14677@xerxes.courtesan.com>; from Todd.Miller@courtesan.com on Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 07:20:56PM -0600 References: <5.1.0.14.0.20010908153417.0286b4b8@192.168.0.12> <200109082103.f88L3fK29117@earth.backplane.com> <20010908154617.A73143@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908170257.A82082@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010908174304.A88816@xor.obsecurity.org> <20010909045226.A33654@nagual.pp.ru> <20010908180848.A94567@xor.obsecurity.org> <200109090120.f891KvM14677@xerxes.courtesan.com>
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--WIyZ46R2i8wDzkSu Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Sat, Sep 08, 2001 at 07:20:56PM -0600, Todd C. Miller wrote: > In message <20010908180848.A94567@xor.obsecurity.org> > so spake Kris Kennaway (kris): >=20 > > The vulnerability involves uucp being made to run arbitrary commands > > as the uucp user through specifying a custom configuration file - see > > bugtraq. There may be other problems resulting from user-specified > > configuration files. I don't have time to go through the code and fix > > up the revocation of privileges right now..in the meantime, this > > prevents the root exploit where a user replaces a uucp-owned binary > > like uustat, which is called daily by /etc/periodic. >=20 > Is there really any reason to run uustat as root? Why not just run > it as user uucp via su? For that matter, running non-root owned > executables from daily seems like a really bad idea. Yeah, thats probably a good change to make. However the uucp vulnerability still lets e.g. arbitrary users read/modify uucp spool data, create files, access the uucp:dialer devices, etc. Kris --WIyZ46R2i8wDzkSu Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Disposition: inline -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.6 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iD8DBQE7msvHWry0BWjoQKURAgOsAKDUaW67EnSmSBPj/wNhDf1GTr3YJgCfUhp2 l39v0hcNcqdhOFtbvN3UZnE= =m8Gv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --WIyZ46R2i8wDzkSu-- To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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