Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2001 12:15:24 -0700 (PDT) From: Matt Dillon <dillon@earth.backplane.com> To: Ruslan Ermilov <ru@FreeBSD.ORG> Cc: Assar Westerlund <assar@FreeBSD.ORG>, security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: [PATCH] Re: FreeBSD remote root exploit ? Message-ID: <200107191915.f6JJFOM77379@earth.backplane.com> References: <5.1.0.14.0.20010719001357.03e22638@192.168.0.12> <014d01c11031$bdab5a10$2001a8c0@clitoris> <20010719201407.B61061@sunbay.com> <003701c11077$b3125400$0d00a8c0@alexus> <3B5718A0.2B650C9C@oksala.org> <200107191752.f6JHqer75736@earth.backplane.com> <20010719205948.D67829@sunbay.com> <200107191817.f6JIHSJ76262@earth.backplane.com> <20010719215957.A74024@sunbay.com>
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:... :> that format is "%s" and the argument is "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"? :> Then strlen(format) could be < remaining but the result of the vsnprintf() :> could still be > remaining. :> :> The output_data() calls for the various options are safe, strlen(format) :> will always be larger then the actual formatted result. But the :> debugging and crypto calls to output_data() are not safe. :> :> -Matt :> :> : netflush(); :> : remaining = BUFSIZ - (nfrontp - netobuf); :> : } :> : ret = vsnprintf(nfrontp, remaining, format, args); :> :Should be fixed in state.c,v 1.7. Thanks, Assar! : :Cheers, :-- :Ruslan Ermilov Oracle Developer/DBA, I think an immediate MFC is acceptable for this situation! -Matt To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-security" in the body of the message
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