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Date:      Thu, 4 May 2000 13:31:15 -0500 (EST)
From:      "Andrew J. Korty" <ajk@iu.edu>
To:        Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za>
Cc:        Matthew Dillon <dillon@apollo.backplane.com>, security@FreeBSD.ORG
Subject:   Re: Cryptographic dump(8) 
Message-ID:  <Pine.BSF.4.21.0005041323480.26511-100000@verbal.uits.iupui.edu>
In-Reply-To: <200005040635.IAA05693@grimreaper.grondar.za>

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> > That sounds good, but I should probably leave the very first
> > header as cleartext.  That way, I can put a flag there to tell
> > restore whether or not this tape is encrypted or not.
> 
> Fair enough.

I'm starting to second guess this decision, since an attacker could
get inode numbers from the cleartext headers and perform known-text
attacks by guessing which binaries have those inode numbers.

If I need to put the random string at the beginning of the header,
then we're throwing the old file format out the window anyway, so
I might as well encrypt everything.

> > >     Also, putting a random number in each block is important if each block
> > >     is separately encrypted, for the same reason.
> > 
> > Would it be acceptable to encrypt the header and block together
> > but each header/block pair separately?  I don't think I have room
> > to add anything in the block, so maybe I could get that randomness
> > from what I add to the header (CBC should propagate it a little).
> 
> The more you separate, the better chance you give for certain types of
> attacks; you are not giving much at all, but you are adding a tiny
> weakness. Attackers can use anything "known" about the structure
> of the data, and you are giving them the boundaries.

The reason for the separation is so that one corrupted block does
not render the entire tape useless.

-- 
Andrew J. Korty, Lead Security Engineer
Office of the Vice President for Information Technology
Indiana University



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