Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 21:37:14 -0600 From: Wes Peters <wes@softweyr.com> To: Snob Art Genre <ben@narcissus.net> Cc: freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: secure deletion Message-ID: <3746266A.73D34043@softweyr.com> References: <Pine.BSF.3.96.990521185533.42784B-100000@narcissus.net>
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Snob Art Genre wrote:
>
> So I can see some use for functionality that overwrites files on unlink()
> thoroughly enough to prevent further reading by the disk head, even if it
> offers no protection against the kind of specialized reading devices that
> can be used on a captured hard disk platter.
>
> I'm not advocating this measure so much as pointing out that there is a
> perceptible level of security between what we currently have and
> military-grade.
I agree, if your security measures cost more than the worth of your
data, you're shooting yourself in the foot. But, on the other hand,
if you're going to implement a page- or file-overwriting algorithm,
you might as well use one that has some chance of success, as opposed
to the "pissing in the wind" effort of overwriting them with zeroes.
The pattern used in rm -P is a step in the right direction, but alter-
nating bits works better than successive generations of all ones then
all zeroes.
--
"Where am I, and what am I doing in this handbasket?"
Wes Peters Softweyr LLC
http://www.softweyr.com/~softweyr wes@softweyr.com
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