From owner-freebsd-security@FreeBSD.ORG Mon Jun 11 08:51:46 2012 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [69.147.83.52]) by hub.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ABD4A1065670; Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:51:46 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from des@des.no) Received: from smtp.des.no (smtp.des.no [194.63.250.102]) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 688468FC16; Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:51:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ds4.des.no (smtp.des.no [194.63.250.102]) by smtp.des.no (Postfix) with ESMTP id BFBF667B0; Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:51:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ds4.des.no (Postfix, from userid 1001) id 959AC9EC3; Mon, 11 Jun 2012 10:51:45 +0200 (CEST) From: =?utf-8?Q?Dag-Erling_Sm=C3=B8rgrav?= To: Damian Weber References: <86r4tqotjo.fsf@ds4.des.no> <6E26E03B-8D1D-44D3-B94E-0552BE5CA894@FreeBSD.org> <20120610145351.GA1098@reks> Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 10:51:45 +0200 In-Reply-To: (Damian Weber's message of "Sun, 10 Jun 2012 18:55:18 +0200 (CEST)") Message-ID: <86ehpmp6xq.fsf@ds4.des.no> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/23.3 (berkeley-unix) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: freebsd-security@freebsd.org, Gleb Kurtsou , "Simon L. B. Nielsen" Subject: Re: Default password hash X-BeenThere: freebsd-security@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.5 Precedence: list List-Id: "Security issues \[members-only posting\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 08:51:46 -0000 Damian Weber writes: > *collision* attacks are relatively easy these days, but against 1 MD5,=20 > not against 1000 times MD5 I'm not talking about collision attacks, I'm talking about brute-forcing hashes. > there is a NIST hash competition running, the winner will soon be announc= ed > (and it won't be SHA256 or SHA512 ;-) > http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/timeline.html > so my suggestion would be to use all of the finalists - especially > the winner - for password hashing > * BLAKE > * Gr=C3=B8stl=20 > * JH > * Keccak > * Skein > see, for example, http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/sha3_010511.cfm There's a world of difference between switching the default to an algorithm we already support and which is widely used by other operating systems, and switching to a completely knew and untested algorithm. DES --=20 Dag-Erling Sm=C3=B8rgrav - des@des.no