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Date:      Tue, 03 Sep 2019 14:07:08 -0000
From:      "Rodney W. Grimes" <freebsd@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
To:        John Baldwin <jhb@freebsd.org>
Cc:        Conrad Meyer <cem@freebsd.org>, src-committers@freebsd.org, svn-src-all@freebsd.org, svn-src-head@freebsd.org
Subject:   Re: svn commit: r346250 - in head: share/man/man4 share/man/man9 sys/dev/random sys/kern sys/libkern sys/sys
Message-ID:  <201904162251.x3GMp2aF097103@gndrsh.dnsmgr.net>
In-Reply-To: <457a2c63-f062-8fc6-15d4-6f5b93981930@FreeBSD.org>

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> On 4/15/19 11:40 AM, Conrad Meyer wrote:
> > Author: cem
> > Date: Mon Apr 15 18:40:36 2019
> > New Revision: 346250
> > URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/346250
> > 
> > Log:
> >   random(4): Block read_random(9) on initial seeding
> >   
> >   read_random() is/was used, mostly without error checking, in a lot of
> >   very sensitive places in the kernel -- including seeding the widely used
> >   arc4random(9).
> >   
> >   Most uses, especially arc4random(9), should block until the device is seeded
> >   rather than proceeding with a bogus or empty seed.  I did not spy any
> >   obvious kernel consumers where blocking would be inappropriate (in the
> >   sense that lack of entropy would be ok -- I did not investigate locking
> >   angle thoroughly).  In many instances, arc4random_buf(9) or that family
> >   of APIs would be more appropriate anyway; that work was done in r345865.
> 
> There are definitely places arc4random is used where sleeping is not allowed.
> ipsec generating nonces for AES-CBC is one example I can think of off the
> top of my head.  I think it might be useful to add an explicit WITNESS_WARN
> in arc4random to catch these cases so they can be found and reasoned about.
> 
> >   This change primarily impacts the behavior of /dev/random on embedded
> >   systems with read-only media that do not configure "nodevice random".  We
> >   toggle the default from 'charge on blindly with no entropy' to 'block
> >   indefinitely.'  This default is safer, but may cause frustration.  Embedded
> >   system designers using FreeBSD have several options.  The most obvious is to
> >   plan to have a small writable NVRAM or NAND to persist entropy, like larger
> >   systems.  Early entropy can be fed from any loader, or by writing directly
> >   to /dev/random during boot.  Some embedded SoCs now provide a fast hardware
> >   entropy source; this would also work for quickly seeding Fortuna.  A 3rd
> >   option would be creating an embedded-specific, more simplistic random
> >   module, like that designed by DJB in [1] (this design still requires a small
> >   rewritable media for forward secrecy).  Finally, the least preferred option
> >   might be "nodevice random", although I plan to remove this in a subsequent
> >   revision.
> 
> Note that I actually often run into unseeded systems when doing development
> using qemu for non-x86 architectures.  For example, when booting mips from
> qemu, there is no loader, the kernel just starts, and since the endian is
> opposite, I frequently regenerate the filesystem using makefs.

Isnt this also the case for bhyveload?  We do not go through the loader
there when we are starting a FreeBSD guest, correct?

> John Baldwin
-- 
Rod Grimes                                                 rgrimes@freebsd.org





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