Date: Sat, 01 Jun 2002 16:35:05 -0700 From: Terry Lambert <tlambert2@mindspring.com> To: Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu> Cc: karin@root66.org, freebsd-hackers@FreeBSD.ORG, bfischer@Techfak.Uni-Bielefeld.DE Subject: Re: sandboxing untrusted binaries Message-ID: <3CF95A29.B4FE2078@mindspring.com> References: <20020531105059.GA720_no-support.loc@ns.sol.net> <20020531165629.H86421_root66.org@ns.sol.net> <20020601232254.GE19245@citi.citi.umich.edu>
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Niels Provos wrote: > > I suggest getting over the illusion hackers won't be able to hack the > > system if you narrow them a bit, the binaries you run still need > > capabilities to correctly function, which are always enough to hack the > > system. > This is not correct either. There is no illusion here. Please, give > me an example where the capabilities needed "are always enough to hack > the system." Say gaim or opera. Any application whose call subset is still von Neumann complete is capable of being hacked to implement any program, if it is capable of being hacked. Sand-boxing strikes me as a way to close the the hen house with the weasel inside: it doesn't do anything for the chickens. -- Terry To Unsubscribe: send mail to majordomo@FreeBSD.org with "unsubscribe freebsd-hackers" in the body of the message
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