Date: Wed, 30 May 2001 18:35:26 +0100 From: Nik Clayton <nik@freebsd.org> To: Matt Dillon <dillon@earth.backplane.com> Cc: Mike Smith <msmith@FreeBSD.ORG>, stable@FreeBSD.ORG Subject: Re: adding "noschg" to ssh and friends Message-ID: <20010530183526.A94961@catkin.nothing-going-on.org> In-Reply-To: <200105292334.f4TNYKg31968@earth.backplane.com>; from dillon@earth.backplane.com on Tue, May 29, 2001 at 04:34:20PM -0700 References: <200105292336.f4TNaRT01704@mass.dis.org> <200105292334.f4TNYKg31968@earth.backplane.com>
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[-- Attachment #1 --] On Tue, May 29, 2001 at 04:34:20PM -0700, Matt Dillon wrote: > :Er, Matt. I appreciate what you're trying to say, but this argument is > :logically invalid. You could use it to argue that any security is a bad > :idea because it forces people to do sneakier things. > > I have to disagree. Here, let me give a contrasting example: > > * you schg a binary > * hacker breaks root > * hacker is unable to modify binary. Whoopie. Hacker decides to rm -rf > your data files instead. > > Problem: Hacker was still able to break root. Setting schg on the > file didn't save you from that. You missed a bit. "Cracker is unable to modify binary. A trojan ssh is not installed, meaning that your passwords are not quietly stolen. In a fit of frustration, cracker runs rm -rf. This is quickly detected, you restore from backups, no other accounts are compromised." N -- FreeBSD: The Power to Serve http://www.freebsd.org/ FreeBSD Documentation Project http://www.freebsd.org/docproj/ --- 15B8 3FFC DDB4 34B0 AA5F 94B7 93A8 0764 2C37 E375 --- [-- Attachment #2 --] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.0.5 (FreeBSD) Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org iEYEARECAAYFAjsVLoIACgkQk6gHZCw343W4jQCfSg0CnKcwgC02ZtodpY7kll2V ISgAn3hc5h3ydN9eKsAKCxd9XdbWFtOJ =qONB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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