From owner-freebsd-announce@freebsd.org Wed May 15 00:03:02 2019 Return-Path: Delivered-To: freebsd-announce@mailman.ysv.freebsd.org Received: from mx1.freebsd.org (mx1.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:606c::19:1]) by mailman.ysv.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B2DE6159D6BD for ; Wed, 15 May 2019 00:03:02 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: from freefall.freebsd.org (freefall.freebsd.org [IPv6:2610:1c1:1:6074::16:84]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) client-digest SHA256) (Client CN "freefall.freebsd.org", Issuer "Let's Encrypt Authority X3" (verified OK)) by mx1.freebsd.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 553628B726; Wed, 15 May 2019 00:03:02 +0000 (UTC) (envelope-from security-advisories@freebsd.org) Received: by freefall.freebsd.org (Postfix, from userid 945) id 44CBB1AB79; Wed, 15 May 2019 00:03:02 +0000 (UTC) From: FreeBSD Security Advisories To: FreeBSD Security Advisories Reply-To: freebsd-security@freebsd.org Precedence: bulk Message-Id: <20190515000302.44CBB1AB79@freefall.freebsd.org> Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 00:03:02 +0000 (UTC) X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 553628B726 X-Spamd-Bar: -- Authentication-Results: mx1.freebsd.org X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-2.93 / 15.00]; local_wl_from(0.00)[freebsd.org]; NEURAL_HAM_MEDIUM(-0.99)[-0.994,0]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.94)[-0.940,0]; ASN(0.00)[asn:11403, ipnet:2610:1c1:1::/48, country:US]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-0.999,0] Subject: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-19:07.mds X-BeenThere: freebsd-announce@freebsd.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 List-Id: "Project Announcements \[moderated\]" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 00:03:03 -0000 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-19:07.mds Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) Category: core Module: kernel Announced: 2019-05-14 Credits: Refer to Intel's security advisory at the URL below for detailed acknowledgements. Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2019-05-14 17:04:00 UTC (stable/12, 12.0-STABLE) 2019-05-14 23:19:08 UTC (releng/12.0, 12.0-RELEASE-p4) 2019-05-14 17:05:02 UTC (stable/11, 11.3-PRERELEASE) 2019-05-14 23:20:16 UTC (releng/11.2, 11.2-RELEASE-p10) CVE Name: CVE-2018-12126, CVE-2018-12127, CVE-2018-12130, CVE-2019-11091 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background Modern processors make use of speculative execution, an optimization technique which performs some action in advance of knowing whether the result will actually be used. II. Problem Description On some Intel processors utilizing speculative execution a local process may be able to infer stale information from microarchitectural buffers to obtain a memory disclosure. III. Impact An attacker may be able to read secret data from the kernel or from a process when executing untrusted code (for example, in a web browser). IV. Workaround No workaround is available. Systems with users or processors in different trust domains should disable Hyper-Threading by setting the machdep.hyperthreading_allowed tunable to 0: # echo 'machdep.hyperthreading_allowed=0 >> /boot/loader.conf' # shutdown V. Solution Perform one of the following: Update CPU microcode, upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, evaluate mitigation and Hyper Threading controls, and reboot the system. New CPU microcode may be available in a BIOS update from your system vendor, or by installing the devcpu-data package or sysutils/devcpu-data port. Ensure that the BIOS update or devcpu-data package is dated after 2014-05-14. If using the package or port the microcode update can be applied at boot time by adding the following lines to the system's /boot/loader.conf: cpu_microcode_load="YES" cpu_microcode_name="/boot/firmware/intel-ucode.bin" Microcode updates can also be applied while the system is running. See cpucontrol(8) for details. 1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install Follow additional details under "Mitigation Configuration" below. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 12.0-STABLE] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.12-stable.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.12-stable.patch.asc # gpg --verify mds.12-stable.patch.asc [FreeBSD 12.0-RELEASE] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.12.0.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.12.0.patch.asc # gpg --verify mds.12.0.patch.asc [FreeBSD 11.3-PRERELEASE] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.11-stable.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.11-stable.patch.asc # gpg --verify mds.11-stable.patch.asc [FreeBSD 11.2-RELEASE] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.11.2.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-19:07/mds.11.2.patch.asc # gpg --verify mds.11.2.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in . Mitigation Configuration Systems with users, processes, or virtual machines in different trust domains should disable Hyper-Threading by setting the machdep.hyperthreading_allowed tunable to 0: # echo machdep.hyperthreading_allowed=0 >> /boot/loader.conf To activate the MDS mitigation set the hw.mds_disable sysctl. The settings are: 0 - mitigation disabled 1 - VERW instruction (microcode) mitigation enabled 2 - Software sequence mitigation enabled (not recommended) 3 - Automatic VERW or Software selection Automatic mode uses the VERW instruction if supported by the CPU / microcode, or software sequences if not. To enable automatic mode at boot: # echo hw.mds_disable=3 >> /etc/sysctl.conf Reboot the system: # shutdown -r +10min "Security update" Check the mitigation status: # sysctl hw.mds_disable_state hw.mds_disable_state: software Silvermont VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/12/ r347567 releng/12.0/ r346594 stable/11/ r347568 releng/11.2/ r347595 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAlzbTspfFIAAAAAALgAo aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEZD MEU4NzhBRTVBRkU3ODgwMjhENjM1NUQzOTc5MkY0OUVBN0U1QzIACgkQ05eS9J6n 5cKcyA//ZlJa5eoNt0L2pcWAjukf1X+/iTjHv/t3wWclEfuPv2S9lO5SDlwxUV5x woGkxcIj7Tp51HJZRBjn62x/cwd6CjbpxsYPUvRs1Nkruj82/p6Yj5nSYrDCqqj1 k84hyCj0Y6V2NwbBEPTNXqqPbOmid0R3GrQJk1JXZ1zTf8VHGxrquXp1xP7PIPSX GWYup0k4edMCY2mbBb8QQQmQSg6S2k6eZnvF9AZUga5pM7FGYLo0rPHNVHx+te83 THvmnrJXnCR5AEjqmsubxwF/p+HneJke7HJxj1GjokzFgzTz3C9X3vUWHedwlVoD BzeqSgWD0icgJMYl8xGabeRzXj49tIzrC+twdXMtTLiDIKGxaRxqGVTMHYHgh44h GilgZ60X4m8e4Nuzf8xcQ1X2/QLvfWwZR+zUzQwOiKVoNp7nPJ5m8nr1s9anqDdl n1fJw3tqw+8ant58k71IKD5lCV0KhJXgD/Kd3TZWu9a4mnMlvuJWYbEKEvxSlvTh ghORCSg+OBEgN//t9a/3UaAOzqKijkN6Iau1JpMrFNtBOXgOO17B1jQGz1R2VKKb mu5gotDQqkdQocN+94sB8T3fouSa6ub2cUox34+DngqxuFeMv6Ffg1o/Z4C0mRUu bVdzPrsUai/Z7O/kBpUF6ddsBGsDXWElfo9flfbJonLcYndWyWc= =QUYl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----